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The Code of Professional Responsibility,
The Kutak Rules, and the Trial Lawyer's
Code: Surprisingly, Three Peas in a Pod
W. WILLIAM HODES*
The Discussion Draft of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct created a firestorm of controversy when it was promul-
gated in January, 1980; during the next sixteen months the
merits of the draft were attacked and defended in print, and at
many formal and informal debates and roundtables. The au-
thor argues that, contrary to stereotype, the Discussion Draft
did not propose radical readjustments of the lawyer's role in
the adversary system. Furthermore, since lawyers are already
subject to duties imposed by law outside any professional code,
much of their conduct will, in practice, be controlled by that
law, and lawyers will legitimately interpret a code to encom-
pass those duties. The author concludes that a major contribu-
tion of the Discussion Draft was to expose as a myth the pub-
lic's perception of the lawyer as a "hired gun," and to make
explicit the fact that the question of the lawyer's obligations to
the client is itself a difficult legal question that requires close
analysis according to the facts of each case. In this view, an
important function of any code of professional conduct is to
educate not just lawyers, but clients.
In an Addendum, the author assesses some of the changes
made in the Proposed Final Draft, issued in May 1981. He con-
cludes that it is now even more clear that a radical reworking
of the adversary system neither was intended nor will result.
The organized Bar and individual lawyers must still take on as
an affirmative duty the task of educating the public about the
limitations of, and the true role of lawyers in, our legal system.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis, Indiana.
Professor Richard A. Lord, visiting from the University of North Dakota School of Law,
spent many hours criticising early drafts of this article. This kind of cooperation is proof
that the "cross-fertilization of ideas" rationale for visiting professorships is sound. Two
other persons also influenced me considerably, although they did not know the extent of it:
Professor Geoffrey Hazard during a walk along San Antonio's Riverwalk at the 1981 Ameri-
can Association of Law Schools (AALS) Convention, and Dean Thomas Morgan in a suc-
cinct letter that showed in about two paragraphs where I had gone off track. I also benefited
from interchanges with my colleagues, Paul Galanti and Bryan Schneider, as well as with
Professor Charles Wolfram and Mr. Sheldon Breskow, Executive Secretary of the Discipli-
nary Commission of the Supreme Court of Indiana.
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I. INTRODUCTION: LOOKING BACKWARD AT THE DISCUSSION DRAFT
When the American Bar Association's Commission on Evalua-
tion of Professional Standards (popularly known as the Kutak
Commission) released its Discussion Draft of proposed Model
Rules of Professional Conduct1 (Discussion Draft) in January 1980,
it perhaps got more discussion than it bargained for. Indeed, dur-
ing the next sixteen months, until the Kutak Commission issued
its proposed Final Draft' on May 30, 1981, the Discussion. Draft
was not so much discussed as it was assaulted. Lawyers and lay-
men alike condemned the Draft as a radical document that called
for major and unwanted changes in the traditional adversary sys-
tem of American law, and the role of the American lawyer in it.3
Initially, the Final Draft appears to have been better re-
ceived,4 and even its most persistent critics appear to have muted
. 1. ABA COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980), reprinted in 48 U.S.L.W. 1 (Feb. 19,
1980) (special ed.) [hereinafter cited as MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft)].
2. ABA COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT (Proposed Final Draft, May 30, 1981) (hereinafter cited as MODEL RULES
(Final Draft)].
3. See notes 7-11 and accompanying text infra.
4. This was the theme of a recent article in the American Bar Association Journal.
Winter, Building a New Ethics Code-Changes Wrought in Compromise, 67 A.B.A. J. 687
(1981). The brief article, giving direct quotes from some relevant influential people, claimed
that opposition to the Model Rules from the corporate and securities bar "appeared to be
[Vol. 35:739
THREE PEAS IN A POD
their criticisms.5 As the Final Draft is subjected to more rigorous
scrutiny, however, and as it moves towards possible adoption by
the American Bar Associataion (ABA) House of Delegates' and by
the states, inevitably it will be compared to its predecessor. Is the
new document substantially and substantively different from the
Discussion Draft? Is it merely a cosmetic facelift? Or is it a total
retreat, penned by a properly chastized group of would-be social
architects?
Obviously, answers to these questions can only be based'upon
a full understanding of the original draft. In the main body of this
article, I attempt to take that look backward at the Discussion
Draft, and I conclude that the Model Rules were never the radical
attack on the adversary system that they were widely assumed to
be. Instead, what was new and perhaps unsettling about them was
their frankness in putting out for public inspection the fact that
the adversary system itself was not what it was widely assumed to
be. If the Discussion Draft did modify the adversary system, it
modified an adversary system that had probably never existed ex-
cept in mythology, and certainly did not exist in fact in 1980. Peo-
ple who believed in the myth and were unhappy about its demise
simply transferred their anger to the Discussion Draft.
A second unsettling aspect of the Discussion Draft presents
something of a paradox. The Model Rules were more of a black-
letter criminal law style code than had ever been proposed before,7
but at the same time they were written in language that softened
the commands considerably, and made them subject to a rule of
reason. Played out frequently in the comments to the rules and in
the preamble,8 the theme of the Discussion Draft was that clearcut
easing," and that there was "some evidence" that the Rules were "rallying support" from
previously "hostile" state and local bar associations. Id. at 688.
5. Professor Monroe Freedman has been quoted as saying that the Final Draft is "a lot
cleaner than it was before," although he still maintains that it represents "a radical depar-
ture from the traditional lawyer-client relationship." Id.
6. A preliminary hearing on the Final Draft was held at the ABA's Annual Meeting in
New Orleans, which commenced on August 8, 1981. The Final Draft will be submitted for a
formal vote to the ABA House of Delegates at the 1982 mid-year meeting in Chicago.
7. See generally Kutak, Evaluating the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, 1980 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 1016; Patterson, Wanted: A New Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, 63 A.B.A. J. 639 (1977); Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of
Ethics, 1980 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 953.
8. The first two paragraphs of the "Scope" section of the Final Draft, which appears
immediately after the Preamble, best capture the spirit and approach of the entire docu-
ment, and were carried forward virtually verbatim from the Discussion Draft:
The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They should be in-
terpreted with reference to the purposes of legal representation and of the law
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answers to actual ethical problems could not be written out in ad-
vance; instead, what the Draft proposed was a method of analysis,
despite the black-letter style. The proposal contemplated that law-
yers would not be able to give advance answers, either to their cli-
ents or to themselves, about where the proper balance would lie in
particular cases. Rather, just as in other areas of the law, specific
answers would depend on specific configurations of facts, and on
the ever-changing universe of law generally. This had been the case
under all previous codes dealing with lawyer behavior, but it was
more directly built into the Discussion Draft, and probably con-
tributed to the uneasiness the Draft engendered.
The main body of this article is an expanded version of some
itself. Some of the Rules are imperatives, cast in the terms "shall" or "shall not."
These prescribe or limit the lawyer's professional conduct. Others, generally cast
in the term "may," define areas under the Rules in which the lawyer has profes-
sional discretion. Other Rules define the nature of relationships between the
lawyer and others. Taken together, the Rules provide elements of the lawyer's
professional role. The Rules are thus partly obligatory or disciplinary and partly
constitutive in that they define a lawyer's professional role.
The Rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer's role. That
context includes court rules and other laws regulating the profession (such as
admission to practice), laws defining specific obligations of lawyers (such as the
attorney-client privilege) and substantive and procedural law in general. Compli-
ance with the Rules, as with all law in an open society, depends primarily upon
understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by
peer and public opinion, and finally, when necessary, upon enforcement through
disciplinary proceedings. The Rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and eth-
ical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activ-
ity can be completely defined by legal rules. The Rules simply provide a legal
structure for the ethical practice of law.
MODEL RULES (Final Draft), supra note 3, at 3. Typical of commentary that acknowledged
the balancing required to decide individual cases was the passage in the Discussion Draft
that addressed discretionary disclosure of client secrets having to do with future harms or
wrongs committed during the representation but not involving danger to life:
When some lesser deliberate wrong is involved, as stated in paragraph (c)(2), the
lawyer has professional discretion to make disclosure to prevent the client's act.
To some extent the existence of this discretion inhibits disclosure by the client
and yet enables the lawyer to inhibit the client from committing the wrongful
act.
The lawyer's exercise of discretion requires consideration of the magnitude
and proximity of the contemplated wrong, the nature of the lawyer's relationship
with the client and with those who might be injured by the client, the lawyer's
own involvement in the transaction, and factors that may extenuate the conduct
in question. Exercising discretion in such a matter inevitably involved stress for
the client, the lawyer, and the client-lawyer relationship. However, if the ques-
tion of disclosure is not made discretionary, a categorical preference has to be
adopted in favor either of immediate victims of a present client or potential vic-
tims of later clients. There is no basis upon which such a categorical preference
can be prescribed.
MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 1, rule 1.7, Comment at 7.
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comments I made at a panel discussion in October 1980,9 when I
was not looking back at the discussion period, but was involved in
it. Furthermore, all of the substantive work on the article was com-
pleted before publication of the Final Draft, and before I had ac-
cess to it or any of the intervening working drafts.
Partly for that reason, but largely in order to avoid the gram-
matical nightmare of referring hypothetically to what the situation
would have been under the now superseded Discussion Draft, the
editors have wisely chosen to present the main body of the article
from the temporal point of view of Spring 1981. The point of view
is thus of one who is comparing the three rival codes referred to in
the title, and who is also conscious that a revision of one of them is
well under way.
In an Addendum,10 I turn to the Final Draft and comment on
the retained or amended provisions that were implicated in the
main body of the article. My conclusion is that the final product is
a much improved one, though still far from perfect. Without sacri-
ficing or compromising substantive content, the drafters have ex-
plained more clearly what the Model Rules are about, and have
removed some of the language that was most misunderstood.
More importantly, these clarifications should help both the
Bar and the public understand that the proposed Model Rules are
not and never were a radical departure from the actual, as opposed
to the mythical, traditions of the legal profession. Instead, the
Model Rules may turn out to be radical in an ironically different
way, for they force us to think more clearly about what the law of
professional responsibility already is, and challenge us to serve si-
multaneously our clients, our legal system, and ourselves.1"
9. Indianapolis Bar Association Seminar, Indianapolis, Indiana, October 22, 1980.
10. See notes 179-255 and accompanying text infra.
11. The Preamble uses a particularly felicitous phrase in acknowledging that the law-
yer's own interests cannot realistically be ignored, and should not be. That third interest is
characterized as "the lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright person while earning a
satisfactory living." By using a phrase with a slightly "old-fashioned" ring to it, the Pream-
ble appears to me to be deliberately straddling the past and the future, and urging us not to
be embarrased about articulating personal ethical norms. More importantly, the phrase
makes one of the Commission's main points: although the Model Rules are written down in
a code format, actual decisions will depend upon the case-by-case judgments of individual
lawyers, and individual lawyers must frequently consult personal ethical values to decide
close cases. See the comparable introductory material quoted at the beginning of note 8,
supra.
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II. THREE CODES, THREE STEREOTYPES, AND A SURPRISING
DISCOVERY
Between January 1980 and May 1981, three rival codes gov-
erning lawyer conduct vied for the attention and support of law-
yers. Each of the three was soon stereotyped, and much of the de-
bate then assumed that one or the other of these oversimplified
models would carry the day.
The present Code of Professional Responsibility" (the Code),
adopted in 1969,13 was generally regarded as a serviceable old
friend," but one with warts that could no longer be overlooked.'5
12. As explained in its Preamble, the Code of Professional Responsibility is organized
into three separate but interrelated parts: Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary
Rules. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
ABA CODE]. The nine Canons are "statements of axiomatic norms," and serve as chapter
headings. Id. The Ethical Considerations are "aspirational" and not mandatory, although
they frequently track the language or at least embody the spirit of some of the formal and
mandatory Disciplinary Rules. Id. The supreme courts of Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, South
Carolina, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia, have made the Ethical Considerations mandatory
upon lawyers in their jurisdictions. Legal Times of Washington, Dec. 15, 1980, at 19, 20, col.
2. Other courts, including those of Kansas, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Illinois, Oklahoma,
and California, have omitted the Ethical Considerations altogether. Id. The Disciplinary
Rules, which are mandatory, set "the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can
fall without being subject to disciplinary action." ABA CODE, supra, at 1.
The focus of this article is almost exclusively on the Disciplinary Rules because the
discussion concerns the extent to which written criminal-law-style rules will deter or pro-
mote conduct. This article cites the Disciplinary Rules as the Code cites them: DR 1-101, for
example.
13. The American Bar Association House of Delegates adopted the Code on August 12,
1969, and it became effective January 1, 1970. ABA CODE, supra note 12, Preface. Most
state supreme courts have adopted verbatim the Code and its various amendments, but in a
number of states certain changes in text have been made or certain amendments not
adopted. For a list of states with Disciplinary Rules that differ from those of the Code, see
ABA NAT'L CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY BY STATE, Table I, at iv (1980) [hereinafter cited as CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY BY STATE].
14. Professor Andrew Kaufman, though not hostile to efforts to improve the Code and
only mildly critical of the draftsmanship of the revisions of the Code proposed by the Kutak
Commission, makes the interesting point that the very familiarity of the present Code cau-
tions against wholesale revision. Kaufman, A Critical First Look at the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 66 A.B.A. J. 1074, 1074-75 (1980). Rather than discarding language
that has ten years' worth of interpretive gloss and starting thousands of lawyers at ground
zero, Professor Kaufman suggests that the ABA retain the format and the basic language of
the Code to give the ultimate amendments more effect.
In response to this and similar criticism, the Kutak Commission issued its Proposed
Final Draft in two formats-one as a line-by-line amendment of the Code. The language of
this draft, however, does not meet Professor Kaufman's plea for continuity. It is nonetheless
the premise of this article that the Model Rules carry forward much of the substance of the
Code.
15. G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1978); Kutak, Coming: The New
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 66 A.B.A. J. 46 (1980); Morgan, The Evolving Con-
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Despite a decade-long process of common law development in the
courts and ethics committees, too many rough edges remained.
The Code was internally inconsistent in several important places,
it overemphasized litigation, and it either ignored or treated poorly
the important question of defining the client and, in group practice
situations, the lawyer. The Code assumed a simpler time, "down-
state Illinois in the 1860's''16 perhaps, and, not ten years after its
adoption, was found to be unfit to guide the conduct of lawyers
who practice in groups on behalf of complex configurations of
citizens.
By 1977, dissatisfaction with the Code prompted the American
Bar Association to form the Kutak Commission to evaluate and
revise the Code. The Commission concluded that the Code needed
more than mere revision and proposed an entire new set of ethical
rules and standards. The Kutak Commission released a discussion
draft of proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct in January
1980.'1
The Model Rules were stereotyped as a radical response to
some admitted but manageable problems, a classic case of the cure
being worse than the disease. 18 Critics saw the Discussion Draft as
radical" primarily, and often exclusively, because of its provisions
regulating the preservation of client confidences and the situations
in which the lawyer may or must disclose them. The general as-
cept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REv. 702 (1977); Patterson, supra note 7;
Stark, Review Essay, The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 12 CONN. L. Rv. 948
(1980).
16. G. HAZARD, supra note 15, at 7.
17. MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 1. The original timetable called for
submission of a revised final draft to the ABA House of Delegates at the Summer 1981
meeting. Because of the storm of criticism that the discussion draft evoked, the timetable
has been put back a full year. The Kutak Commission released the final discussion draft in
May, 1981, and will present it at the 1982 mid-year meeting of the ABA.
Because some of the criticisms concerned the format of the proposed rules, see note 14
supra, the Final Draft appears in two formats. One, like the first discussion draft, is in the
style of a Restatement of the Law, and the second is nearly a line-by-line amendment of the
Code. See id.
18. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ROSCOE POUND-
AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYER'S FOUNDATION, THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT 1 (pub-
lic discussion draft released June, 1980) [hereinafter cited as LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion
Draft)].
19. The Preface to the Discussion Draft acknowledges that the rules push beyond the
Code's foundation, but in the next sentence notes that this is because of the "continuing
evolution in ethical thought" that characterized the 1970's. MODEL RULES (Discussion
Draft), supra note 1, at 1. If the Kutak Commission is correct, then its product is not "radi-
cal" at all; rather it reflects roughly the present state of the law, and demonstrates the
"conservative" nature of the present Code for today's world.
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sumption was that the Discussion Draft, which took into account
interests other than the immediate interests of the client, repre-
sented a substantial and unwanted loosening of the obligation of
confidentiality. Thus, the title of a Wall Street Journal editorial:
"A License to Squeal?"20 Thus, the subtitle of an article published
in a local bar journal: "1984 is NOW! '21 Thus, the unsurprising
report22 from a member of a state task force studying the Discus-
sion Draft that members of the public "react adversely" when told
without elaboration that the Discussion Draft requires a lawyer to
reveal his clients' secrets in six instances and allows him to do so in
five others.2
In June 1980, largely as a response to the Discussion Draft, the
Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyer's Foundation issued a third
alternative, the American Trial Lawyer's Code of Conduct (the
Lawyer's Code).2" The Lawyer's Code was seen as the model that
reaffirmed the primacy of immediate client interests above all
other values in our adversary system. Admittedly, the Lawyer's
Code's attack on the Discussion Draft was somewhat shrill,25 and
hence less effective. It is also true that the Lawyer's Code devel-
oped the claimed constitutional underpinnings of the adversary
system-the liberties of the individual-in a criminal law context
and then applied them willy-nilly to all areas of the law.26 Still, the
20. The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 11, 1980, at 20, col. 1.
21. Koskoff, Proposed New Code of Professional Responsibility: 1984 is Now!, 54
CONN. B.J. 260 (1980) (punctuation in original). Mr. Koskoff is the President of the Associa-
tion of Trial Lawyers of America, and had another opportunity to attack the Discussion
Draft in his Introduction to the Lawyer's Code. See note 25 infra.
22. Osborn, The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 24 RES GESTAE 308 (1980).
23. Id. at 308. The members of the public who reacted this way obviously did not know
(and were not told) that the Code and the law of evidence already require disclosure in
many of the same situations.
24. LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 18. The Foundation had formed a
Commission on Professional Responsibility for Trial Practice in 1979, but the Commission
did not long limit its concern to trial practice. When the Kutak Commission's Discussion
Draft was published in January 1980, the Foundation's Commission saw its task as provid-
ing-an alternative-which it did in June of the same year. Id. Introduction.
25. For example, the Introduction to the Lawyer's Code asserts:
The proponents of an alternative to this Code have apparently forgotten [the
basic fact that only an adversary system protects the liberty of the individual].
Their most recent draft would erode basic constitutional protections by making
the lawyer the agent of the state, not the champion of the client, in many impor-
tant respects.
Id. The Introduction further claims that "the lawyer's office .... is under attack from
those who would make it a listening post for the state ...." Id.
26. Id. passim. In the Preamble, the Foundation attempted to base the constitutional
rights that affect lawyers' responsibilities not on the criminal law provisions of the fifth and
sixth amendments, but on the "most basic individual right, that of personal autonomy-the
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general perception remained that the Lawyer's Code was the wel-
come antidote to the balancing approach of the Discussion Draft
and came closest to the traditional view of the attorney as the
"hired gun" of the client.
Most lawyers would probably admit that the hired-gun ap-
proach, in its most uncompromising form, has never been and
should not be the actual tradition of the legal profession.27 Never-
theless, the client-centered approach of the Lawyer's Code has
great appeal to American lawyers for at least three reasons. First,
it appeals to the combative sporting instinct that is pervasive in all
walks of life in the United States. Second, it appears to confirm
generally held ideas about market solutions to problems: if each
right to make those decisions that most affect one's own life and values." Id. at 4. Earlier,
the Introduction claimed both that the adversary system "carries forward the basic Ameri-
can values incorporated in the Bill of Rights," and that the fact that our system of justice is
an adversary one is "so basic that the Constitution does not even mention it." Id. at ii.
Professor Freedman, in his contribution to this symposium, returns to this theme. See
Freedman, Are the Model Rules Unconstitutional?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 685 (1981). It is
well beyond the scope of this article, however, to consider whether values not actually men-
tioned in the Constitution nonetheless maintain a penumbral presence in the document,
whether five members of the Supreme Court do well to announce their discovery, or whether
this task can be allotted to lawyers who do not sit on the Court.
Recently, Professor Harry Subin noted another flaw in the argument that client confi-
dentiality is a principle with constitutional underpinnings-a flaw that is often overlooked.
National Law Journal, Jan. 19, 1981, at 22, col. 1. Professor Subin showed that even if one
grants that the adversary system itself, in both criminal and civil matters, has privacy and
other first amendment overtones, that is still only half of the argument. It remains to be
proven that the confidentiality principle is so fundamental to the adversary system that the
system cannot exist without it.
It is intuitively obvious that if there were no generally accepted idea of client confiden-
tiality, clients would not tell their lawyers their secrets and lawyers could not adequately
perform their functions. It is not clear, however, how much less information would flow from
the client to his lawyer if incrementally more exceptions were made to the principle. Profes-
sor Subin points out that those who attack all encroachments on the confidentiality princi-
ple assume that the information flow would instantly be so affected as to destroy the adver-
sary system itself. Id. This is unlikely to happen because the confidentiality principle has
always had built-in exceptions, and even the Lawyer's Code retains most of the exceptions.
See text accompanying notes 61, 64, and 67, infra.
27. Nothing has been more potential in creating and pandering to popular
prejudice against lawyers as a class, and in withholding from the profession the
full measure of public esteem and confidence which belong to the proper dis-
charge of its duties, than the false claim, often set by the unscrupulous in de-
fense of questionable transactions, that it is an attorney's duty to do everything
to succeed in his client's cause.
CODE OF ETHICS (of Alabama) Canon 10, reprinted in 118 Ala. XXIII (1897). The Alabama
Code was the first formal code of ethics, and the provisions of Canon 10 can readily be
traced through Canon 32 of the 1908 American Bar Association Canons of Ethics to Canon 7
of the present Code: "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of
the Law." ABA CODE, supra note 12, Canon 7.
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participant obtains good lawyers, and each lawyer works for his
own client without considering the interests of third parties or of
the public, the public interest will take care of itself, guided by the
"invisible hand" of law development.' Third, it helps shield law-
yers from ethical dilemmas, and possibly even criminal and tort
liability, because the lawyer can try to justify his actions by claim-
ing that the client dictated them.29
At the height of the discussion period, then, the three Codes
had become shorthand symbols for three clearly different views of
law and lawyering. Even though everyone must have been aware
that all three codes took the same basic position on many routine
matters, that was often ignored. The Discussion Draft represented
no less than the destruction of the adversary system; the Lawyer's
Code had enshrined a somewhat unsavory (though romantic) view
of the adversary system in the Constitution; the present Code was
so naively out of touch with reality that it commanded little
respect.
It was in this atmosphere that I was invited to take the "pro-
Kutak" position at a panel discussion sponsored by a local Bar As-
sociation.30 I was invited, incidentally, not because I was a known
advocate of the Discussion Draft, but because the organizers of the
panel could think of no one other than a law school teacher of Pro-
fessional Responsibility who would fill the bill. I accepted, but not
without reservations, for I was dubious about the radical reworking
of lawyer-client relationships that I, too, assumed the Discussion
Draft embodied.
In preparing for the panel discussion, I did what I frequently
ask my students to do in "statutory interpretation" courses such as
Civil Procedure and Professional Responsibility: I took apart the
language of the three rival codes, line by line and word by word.
Without straining the language unreasonably, what are the outer
limits of meaning that can be assigned to each clause and each
phrase? Could real lawyers and real judges legitimately reach those
results? The fruits of my labors surprised me: using nonfrivo-
lous-not even strained-constructions of code language, and mak-
28. Thus, the development of the law is thought to guide the public interest much like
the invisible hand of competition is thought to control an unregulated economy. See A.
SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
29. See Hazard, How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting the Client in Legally Wrong-
ful Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 669 (1981).
30. The Indianapolis Bar Association sponsored this discussion at a seminar held on
October 22, 1980 in Indianapolis, Indiana.
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ing what I took to be reasonable assumptions about deterrence and
compulsion, I found a marked similarity in the results that could
be obtained under the three contending versions of rules of profes-
sional responsibility. What is more, this similarity was not limited
to the fringe areas of the codes, but also appeared in the precise
areas where there were supposed to be such radical differences.
This is not at all to say that statutory interpretation has no
limits, that choice of language or overall tone is unimportant, and
that it therefore makes no difference which code is adopted or
whether we even have a code generally applicable to lawyers. The
"spirit" of a code can significantly influence how it is interpreted,
and there is no doubt that a different spirit informs the Lawyer's
Code and the Discussion Draft. Nonetheless, my point is that there
is enough play in the language of the three codes so that lawyerlike
arguments can be made to reach similar results in most cases that
are likely to arise in practice. Thus, while responsible lawyers will
be aware of the precise language of the operative code when mak-
ing difficult decisions that implicate ethical concerns, 1 the precise
language of a particular code will not itself lead inevitably to but a
single result.
Lawyers will have an incentive to engage in "statutory con-
struction" in cases that are at all close, and heavily weighted in
their calculus will be such considerations as possible criminal and
tort liability, malpractice, and even such old-fashioned notions as
the lawyer's reputation and personal stake in maintaining his per-
ception of himself" as an "upright person." 8 Furthermore, all
three codes, both generally and by specific cross-references, impose
upon lawyers the duty to "obey law."84 Given that the codes do not
speak with absolute clarity, this overall duty-even though an-
nounced in general terms-will frequently be the voice that law-
31. My point that code language will not be the main impetus to action or forbearance
applies a fortiori to irresponsible lawyers who have not read the operative code or who do
not care what it says. Although I am sufficiently of this world to recognize that many such
lawyers exist, probably many more than I would care to admit, I have discounted them in
assessing the effects of code language. The drafters of the various codes must similarly have
acknowledged the problem, shrugged their shoulders, and resumed their work.
32. In keeping with modern trends and my own political views, the early drafts of this
article used both feminine and masculine pronouns for gender-neutral references. The edi-
tors of the Review, however, chose to use the third person masculine pronoun in gender-
neutral contexts.
33. MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 1, at 2. If values of this kind are truly
"old-fashioned," it is ironic that they are highlighted in the preamble to the supposedly
"radical" code.
34. See notes 66-67 and accompanying text infra.
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yers heed.
If my basic premise is correct, which I hope to demonstrate in
this article through a series of examples, it should affect stereo-
typed responses to the codes in at least three ways. First, if the
legal community understands that the Discussion Draft is not radi-
cally "anti-client," but is for the most part a fuller treatment of
the law of professional responsibility as it has developed over the
past ten years,3 5 it will be easier to put emotion aside and help the
Kutak Commission perfect its product. Once lawyers recognize, for
example, that the law of privilege" and of joint criminal and tort
liability 7 have already substantially exploded traditional myths
about the inviolability of client confidences, it will be easier to
enter into serious debate about exactly where to draw the final
lines, either in a code or in a particular case. Second, once affected
parties understand that the Lawyer's Code is not dramatically dif-
ferent in practical effect from the Discussion Draft, the reason for
the Lawyer's Code's existence disappears.3 8 The reality of the Law-
yer's Code is that it is not as single-mindedly pro-client as it claims
to be; rather, it contains many of the Discussion Draft's exceptions
to the confidentiality principle, although in disguised form. 9 In
this respect, the Lawyer's Code is actually misleading, and de-
serves to be rejected. The third consequence of finding great simi-
larities in the three codes is longer range and requires some expla-
nation, for it implicates the very process of thinking about ethics
and drafting a code.
Drafting a code to govern lawyers' conduct is itself an enter-
prise fraught with ethical dangers. Lawyers are adept at construing
written language in a partisan way, and there is great danger that
they will succumb to the temptation to use those skills to personal
35. See note 19 supra and note 98 infra.
36. See generally MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 87-97 (2d ed. 1972).
37. See Hazard, supra note 29.
38. The Lawyer's Code is self-conscious about its role as alternative to the Discussion
Draft, which it attacks without naming. See note 25 supra. The following passage comes
closest to admitting that without an "unacceptable" set of rules as a target, there might
never have been a Lawyer's Code:
The Commission was also motivated by the fact that another group, also
originally formed with a narrower jurisdiction, was both arrogating to itself the
function of rewriting professional standards for lawyers, and doing so in a way
that demanded that this Commission produce a viable alternative Code of Con-
duct, applicable to all lawyers.
LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 18, at ii.
39. See notes 50-56 and accompanying text infra.
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advantage when their own conduct is under scrutiny.40 Further-
more, lawyers are most at home performing this interpretative op-
eration when looking at language drafted by other lawyers,
whether in a contract, a statute passed by a lawyer-dominated or
lawyer-influenced legislature, or a set of rules. The lawyer-reader
and the lawyer-writer share a fully internalized corpus of interpre-
tative "maxims," as well as an understanding that these maxims
are themselves subject to many exceptions,"' and that all lawyer-
sponsored language is subject to "reasonable" flexibility.
While each lawyer thus faces a threshold ethical dilemma
when deciding how strictly or loosely to apply the language of a
code of conduct to himself, the drafters of such a code have a cor-
relative problem. Knowing full well that lawyer-readers of their
product will engage in "statutory interpretation" of it, and pre-
sumably intending that at least some such flexibility will attach to
the language, the drafters must choose wording that is relatively
easier or harder to interpret away. Every code thus must place it-
self somewhere on a spectrum running from a "criminal code"
model to a "vague platitudes" model, depending on how the draft-
ers view the overall trustworthiness of lawyers, and whether they
think lawyers will use code language as an evasion device or as a
self-examination and planning tool."2
40. G. HAZARD, supra note 15, at 2-3.
41. See K. LLEWELYN, COMMON LAW TRADITION app. c (1960).
42. Professor James H. Stark takes as a main theme the relationship between the style
and format of a code and its substantive content. Stark, supra note 15. He thinks the Dis-
cussion Draft is "more rule-conscious and consequently less flexible" than the Code, but he
does not find that to be a drawback in and of itself. Id. at 953. Stark praises the Discussion
Draft as a technically well-drafted code that better defines and resolves many ethical issues,
but he is afraid that this very clarity may render some of the key sections unpalatable to the
profession. Id. at 951. It is ever thus: people who need to be reminded of their responsibili-
ties with increased clarity and insistence do not thank those who perform the task.
Although no one can doubt the "criminal law" style of the Discussion Draft, the Kutak
Commission's view of the mandatory nature of rules in general is most instructive:
It is assumed that compliance with the Rules, as with all law in an open
society, is achieved primarily through understanding and voluntary compliance,
secondarily through reinforcement by peer and public opinion, and finally, when
necessary, by enforcement through disciplinary proceedings. The Rules, how-
ever, do not exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a
lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal
rules. The Rules simply provide a legal framework for the ethical practice of
Law.
MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 1, at 2. Both the content and the style bear the
unmistakable imprint of Professor Hazard's work. See G. HAZARD, supra note 15. As noted
in the Introduction to this article, see note 8 and accompanying text supra, this passage was
carried forward to the Final Draft, and quintessentially captures the flavor of what the
Kutak Commission thought it was doing-drafting "law," but at the same time recognizing
19811
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
After placing their code somewhere on this general spectrum,
the drafters must also be aware that their final product will find
different individual lawyers at different places on a personal ethi-
cal spectrum. Some lawyers need to be watched like a hawk and
constrained by tightly drafted strictures, whereas other lawyers
can be trusted to understand and accept the code without
evasion. S
What, then, is the third consequence of the discovery that the
three codes under consideration are substantially different in tex-
tual language but surprisingly similar in substantive content? I be-
lieve it shows that, in addition to lawyers and ethics committees,
there is a third audience for the codes whose importance has been
underestimated: the public. If one lawyer construes almost any
language to his liking and another hardly needs a code, different
ways of writing the same basic ideas will not greatly influence their
conduct. Furthermore, these lawyers will agree on many points,
and will also be aware that law outside of the codes will frequently
control their conduct more directly than the technical wording of a
new rule. Laymen, on the other hand, are not aware of extracode
law. They are not even "aware of the legitimate constructions that
can be given to legal language that appears to have a "plain"
that "law" is an ever-shifting quicksand.
It is noteworthy that the Lawyer's Code is also considerably more rule-oriented than
the Code and that the Code in turn is even more clearly rule-oriented than the 1908 Can-
nons of Ethics that it replaced. Whether they are right or wrong, it is obvious that code
drafters in recent times increasingly believe that lawyers need full scale regulation and can-
not be trusted to self-police on an individual basis.
Recent code drafters undoubtedly have been influenced by two major developments.
One is the significant and rapid increase in the size of the profession. The number of law-
yers in this country grew by nearly 200,000 between 1972 and 1979. U.S. BUREAU CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1980, Table 697, at 418 (1980). The likely
theory is that new lawyers cannot assimilate the traditions of the profession at a satisfactory
pace unless the profession takes sterner measures. See Kaufman, supra note 14. The second
major development is the public's increasing criticism of the legal profession with the im-
plicit threat that if lawyers do not clean house, someone will do it for them. See, e.g., J.
LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 208-11 (1978); Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, and Pro-
fessional Regulation, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 919.
43. Irresponsible lawyers, who have either not read the relevant code, or do not care
what the code says, have been banished from the discussion entirely. See note 31 supra.
44. The Lawyer's Code is commendably explicit in its Preamble that one of the main
reasons for having a code is to inform the public-potential clients-about the conduct they
should expect from lawyers. LAwYER's CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 18, Preamble, at
3. The Discussion Draft has no such introductory statement as to purpose, but its "Mi-
randa" section, rule 1.4(b), explicitly carries out this function. See notes 120 and 165-69 and
accompanying text infra. A major conclusion of this article is that the Miranda feature of
any code is its lynchpin, precisely because it provides the method by which the profession
can educate individual clients about the relationships they enter into with their lawyers.
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meaning, let alone the evasions which some lawyers will engage in.
Laymen believe that "what they see is what they get," and it is
therefore critical to the longterm relationship between the Bar and
the public to make sure that what they see is sound.
The purpose of careful selection of code language is thus only
partially to educate and regulate lawyers; the choice of code lan-
guage is also part of a legitimate process of public relations and
public education. This is so because although only a small number
of laymen will be aware of any new code, and only a trivial number
will have read it, lawyers will "teach" it to them, one at a time. At
the very first interview, potential clients must be told the truth
about what they can expect, and what they must not expect, in
their dealings with lawyers.
In the pages that follow, I examine the practical effect of the
language of the three alternative codes in some of the situations
that provoke the most heated arguments between their advocates.
I do not claim to have done any empirical research on how lawyers
would actually react in the situations discussed, and I am in any
event skeptical as to whether lawyers would give accurate data on
such matters to social scientists, even anonymously, and whether
they really even know how they would react before the moment of
truth arrives. Furthermore, in all but the easiest cases, I do not
even claim to predict the response of lawyers generally. Rather, I
try to recreate their likely thought processes and assess the weight
that they probably will assign to the niceties of code languge. Most
often I conclude that a lawyer faced with an ethical question will
weigh most heavily concerns other than the precise language of the
code, although that does not mean that language is irrelevant.
The next three sections of this article describe the following
scenarios: 1) situations in which the lawyer must, may, or must not
reveal client confidences, and the extent to which the lawyer's obli-
gation "to obey law" either complicates or perhaps even destroys
the duty of confidentiality; 2) conflict-of-interest situations inher-
ent in the representation of entity clients; and 3) specific applica-
tions of the confidentiality principle in the context of client
perjury.
A final section of this article discusses the significance of what
has been called the "Miranda" provision of the Discussion Draft:
the requirement that lawyers inform their clients of the limits on
the confidentiality principle."' The Miranda feature actually brings
45. MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 1, rule 1.4(b). See notes 165-69 and
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me full circle and illustrates my main point: a key function of
whatever new code the ABA adopts is to educate clients, not just
lawyers. Although fine distinctions in a code may not significantly
affect lawyer conduct, overall tone and choice of language will af-
fect how clients view the law and their lawyers. Most importantly,
advising clients of the limits a code places on their lawyers will put
ultimate responsibility for choosing a course of conduct back on
the client-where it belongs."
A. Revealing Client Confidences-Mandatory or Discretionary?
I start comparison of the three codes where most people start
and many stop-with the provisions involving keeping or revealing
client confidences. As noted earlier,47 the general perception is that
the Discussion Draft significantly narrows the area in which the
principle of confidentiality is at work."
Perhaps the most controversial rule of the Discussion Draft is
1.7(b), which states that a lawyer shall disclose information that is
adverse to the client, to the extent necessary "to prevent the client
from committing an act that would result in death or serious bod-
ily harm to another person," and to the extent required by "law"
accompanying text infra.
46. Surprisingly, the core principle that key strategic decisions should be made by
fully-advised clients does not appear in a Disciplinary Rule in the Code, although it does
appear in EC 7-7, which is worded in a more mandatory fashion than many of the Ethical
Considerations. Other than decisions "not affecting the merits" or not "substantially preju-
dicing '" the client, "[tihe authority to make decisions is exclusively that of the client." ABA
CODE, supra note 12, EC 7-7.
Commentary to the Miranda provision, rule 1.14(b), makes explicit the Kutak Commis-
sion's idea that this rule may tempt clients to lie to their own lawyers-but that they will
then have only themselves to blame. See text following note 169 infra.
47. See notes 18-22 and accompanying text supra.
48. In purely definitional terms, the Discussion Draft may actually expand the universe
of potentially protected client confidences, although there are of course exceptions, as dis-
cussed throughout this article. DR 4-101(A) of the Code defines "secrets" of a client as
information "gained in the professional relationship," ABA CODE, supra note 12, DR 4-
101(A), whereas the comparable definition in rule 1.7(a) of the Discussion Draft refers to all
information "which relates to the client-lawyer relationship." MODEL RULES (Discussion
Draft), supra note 1, rule 1.7(a). It is theoretically possible that some information which
"relates to" the client's business was not "gained in" the course of the lawyer's actually
working on the client's business.
In practice, there will not be much to this technical difference. Indeed, in Formal Opin-
ion 341 (1975), discussed at note 134 in ira in connection with the client perjury problem,
the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics read the Code's definition to protect informa-
tion gained from third parties and "in connection with" the representation. ABA COMM. ON
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 341 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Opinion 341]; see text
accompanying note 134 infra. If sound, this interpretation gives the two definitions indistin-
guishable and broad sweep.
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or another rule.4' Neither the present Code nor the Lawyer's Code
has a mandatory disclosure provision, but both contain permissive
disclosure rules which track, almost exactly, the "serious harm"
and the "required by law" provisions of rule 1.7(b).50 The contro-
versy is thus over the word "shall," not over the idea that confi-
dentiality has its limits.
In most of the highly-charged situations in which rule 1.7(b) of
the Discussion Draft would apply, however, lawyers operating
under one of the other codes would similarly find themselves inex-
orably pressured by the situation into disclosing the information
anyway. The situation transforms the seemingly permissive lan-
guage of the other codes into mandatory reality. A few hypotheti-
cals will best illustrate this thesis.
Take first the admittedly unlikely situation in which a client
states that he will kill a named person on a date certain, 1 and the
circumstances are such that the lawyer believes the threat to be so
real that he cannot escape the responsibility of deciding for himself
whether to interdict the client. 2 Rule 1.7(b) of the Discussion
49. MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 1, rule 1.7(b).
50. DR 4-101(C)(3) speaks of "the intention of his client to commit a crime," and obvi-
ously includes situations involving murder and serious assaults. ABA CODE, supra note 12,
DR 4-101(C)(3). Lawyer's Code rule 1.4 speaks of "imminent danger to human life." LAW-
YER'S CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 18, rule 1.4, Alternative A. The "required by law"
language appears in the Code in DR 4-101(C)(2), and in the Lawyer's Code in rule 1.3.
51. The situation discussed is unlikely but not impossible, as can be seen from the fa-
mous case of Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d
334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976), in which the future murderer confided not in a lawyer but in a
psychiatrist. See note 52 infra.
Even though we all know that cases of this kind must be rare, they continue to hold
special fascination, partly because they are so stark that they allow for sharp analysis, but
also surely because of the fact that they are not impossible, and it is easy to get the sinking
feeling that it can happen to you. The textbooks used in the Professional Responsibility
courses in law schools treat these scenarios. See, e.g., M. FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN
ADVERSARY SYSTEM 6 (1975); 0. MELLINKOFF, LAWYERS AND THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE 467-68
(1976); T. MORGAN AND R. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY 276-86 (1981).
Discussion of these "unthinkable but possible" situations is frequently linked with the
problem of the lawyer's coming into possession of fruits and instrumentalities of crime. One
would think that cases in which criminals turn these things over to their lawyers would be
rare. They are rare, but they continue to happen. See note 175 and accompanying text infra.
52. For a case with similar facts, see Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,
17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976), in which the court held a psychologist
liable for failing to warn the intended, and then actual, victim of his patient. The defendant
in Tarasoff knew of the real danger, but did not do enough to stop the murder. In dicta, the
court suggested that psychologists have the duty to reasonably assess the reality of the
threats. Presumably, a lawyer does not have the same skill at assessing a similar situation,
and would not be held to that duty, but the hypothetical discussed in the text assumes that
the lawyer believes to his own moral certainty that the client's threat is real.
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Draft does indeed mandate disclosure, but surely the rule only
confirms what the lawyer already knows he must do.
A lawyer reading the present Code will find DR 4-101(C)(3),
which tells him that he may reveal the intention of the client to
commit this crime, 8 and a reader of the Lawyer's Code will find
rule 1.4 (Alternative A), which instructs that he may disclose the
information in order to prevent "imminent danger to human
life.'5 4 Is there any doubt that both lawyers would prevent the
murder if they were physically able to do so, despite the absence of
a mandatory code provision?
It is possible, of course, that some lawyers would fail to act out
of fear, ineptness, or some other extraneous reason, but it is impos-
sible to believe that any lawyer would forbear from acting because
he thought that action was "unethical." Even Professor Freedman,
who is the Reporter for the Lawyer's Code and whose book" is the
best and best-known serious defense of the confidentiality princi-
ple, has no trouble with this scenario and assumes that the lawyer
not only may, but also should, interdict the client."
The above hypothetical is, I submit, not even controversial, al-
though it shows the operation of what is supposedly the most con-
troversial rule of the Discussion Draft. The example is thus a rudi-
mentary but clear illustration of the principle that when the extra-
code stakes are sufficiently high, the niceties of code language pale
in significance.
1. A VARIATION ON THE BURIED BODIES CASE
A second example, and the last easy one considered in this ar-
ticle, can be found in one of the illustrative cases in the Lawyer's
Code.67 The example builds upon the celebrated New York case a
in which both the court and an ethics committee found that a law-
yer acted properly by not revealing the whereabouts of the corpses
of his client's victims.'9 The follow-up hypothetical assumes that
53. ABA CODE, supra note 12, DR 4-101(C)(3).
54. LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 18, rule 1.4, Alternative A.
55. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 51.
56. Id. at 6.
57. LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 18, Illustrative Case 1(g). The illus-
trative cases in the Lawyer's Code follow each section of the rules and comments, and pro-
vide sharp examples of the reporter's view of the intendment of the previous material.
58. People v. Belge, 82 Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1975). See also N.Y. Times,
Feb. 5, 1975, at 54, col. 5.
59. People v. Beige, 82 Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798. See also N.Y. STATE BAR
COMM'N ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS No. 279 (1978). In that ethics opinion, the ethics
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the lawyer finds one of the victims not yet dead, but in serious
need of medical attention she cannot procure for herself. Should
the lawyer call an ambulance? Because the very participation of
the lawyer and the very discovery of the injured woman may later
come back to haunt the client, the confidences question is
presented full force. Because the hypothetical involves not a
corpse, but a dying woman, the "danger to life" exception is also
center stage.60
Although a technical argument can be made that rule 1.7(b) of
the Discussion Draft does not actually require action that could
lead back to the lawyer's client," few lawyers would read it that
way, or would want to read it that way. Indeed, if they even
thought about a code of ethics at all in the exigencies of the situa-
tion, most lawyers would be glad to have a code that reinforced
what they knew was their moral duty the instant they saw the in-
jured woman.
A lawyer operating under either the present Code or rule 1.4
(Alternative A) of the Lawyer's Code would similarly feel bound to
act, and, just as in the first example, not constrained by code lan-
guage. 2 The moral duty to act is clear; both the Code and the
Lawyer's Code permit action and so the lawyer will act. In this
second hypothetical, then, the difference between supposedly
mandatory disclosure and supposedly permissive disclosure is nil:
an ambulance will be called one hundred percent of the time.
Alternative B of rule 1.4 of the Lawyer's Code, however, pur-
ports to go one step further and actually prohibit action in the
second hypothetical.68 Alternative B pointedly omits even the
"danger of life" exception, and the commentary clearly implies
that in this situation, the client's interests come first. Calling the
ambulance for the dying woman would therefore be a disciplinable
offense. 4
committee found that the attorney acted properly not only in withholding the information,
but in later using the information, with his client's consent, to engage in plea bargaining. Id.
60. See text accompanying notes 49 and 50 supra.
61. A lawyer could argue that rule 1.7(b) of the Discussion Draft, which speaks of
preventing the client from "committing an act" which will result in death, would not apply
because the client already committed the "act." Real-life lawyers would not seek out such
an argument, however, and would reject it if it came into their minds. Lawyers universally
would call the ambulance, and then, if need be, find the easily acceptable interpretation
that the client committed a second and continuing "act" by leaving the woman to die.
62. LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 18, rule 1.4, Alternative A; ABA
CODE, supra note 12, DR 4-101(C)(3).
63. LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 18, rule 1.4, Alternative B.
64. "The Lawyer has not committed a disciplinary violation under Alternative A." Id.
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This absolutist position is, of course, pure fantasy and pure
bravado, but it illustrates my point that frequently code language
is intended to impress the lay public and not lawyers. (Whether
this is a particularly good fantasy to advertise to the public I leave
to the drafters of Alternative B)." Lawyers who read Alternative
B, noting the absence of an applicable exception and understand-
ing the implications of the commentary, would still call the ambu-
lance. Either they would engage in "statutory construction" and
conclude, in lawyerlike fashion, that even a provision without any
exceptions must have implicit exceptions to avoid absurdity, or
they would deliberately disobey the rule, confident that the occa-
sion for civil disobedience was unequivocally at hand. Laymen, on
the other hand, might believe that Alternative B really means what
it says.
2. OBEDIENCE TO "LAW": THE THREE CODES MERGE
The two hypotheticals considered thus far were too easy to
provide a true test of the three codes, although they do begin to
show how code language alone is not determinative. The examples
were easy because there is no disagreement among lawyers-nor
could there be-as to what would constitute proper conduct in the
hypothetical situations, and therefore the particular language of
any code is assumed to embody that universal agreement. The
more difficult and more important testing scenarios involve issues
upon which there is not general agreement, but instead robust and
legitimate debate.
Ironically, even in the difficult and truly controversial cases,
the relevant language of the three codes is almost identical; each
code either requires or permits disclosure of client confidences to
the extent required by law or court order."6 Obviously, the content
of that "law" is critical in assessing what conduct the codes permit
or require. Furthermore-and this is my main point-since lawyers
generally have an affirmative duty to obey "law, ' '" 7 the supposedly
Illustrative Case 1(g) (emphasis added).
65. Although Professor Freedman is the reporter for the Lawyer's Code, Alternative B
is contrary to his position on this issue. See text accompanying notes 52-56 supra.
66. LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 18, rule 1.3; ABA CODE, supra note
12, DR 4-101(C)(2); MODEL RuLzs (Discussion Draft), supra note 1, rule 1.7(b).
67. LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 18, rule 8.1; ABA CODE, supra note
12, DR-102(A)(3), (4), (5), (6); MODEL RuLEs (Discussion Draft), supra note 1, rule 1.3(b)
and 10.4(b). In addition, of course, lawyers are citizens who share the obligation of all citi-
zens to obey law. One way of looking at the issues discussed in this section of this article,
however, is to ask whether the special relationship of lawyer to client vitiates the duty to
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permissive disclosure rules of the Code6" and the Lawyer's Code6 '
can very easily be transformed into mandatory rules.
Indeed, if lawyers universally agreed on what the non-code
"law" is, the practical effect of the three codes would be the same.
For if a lawyer acknowleded that he was "required by law" to di-
vulge a certain confidence, and no code prohibited the disclosure,
he would disclose. The rub is that lawyers either do not agree on
the scope of non-code law-such as the law of privilege, the law of
joint tort liability, the law of joint criminal responsibility, and the
law of agency-or they do not fully accept that all three of the
codes require them to obey precisely those same "laws." In the ex-
amples that follow, then, it is important to remember that while
lawyers may disagree vehemently on the proper course of action,
they will not often disagree about the meaning of the contending
codes. Rather, they will disagree about what "the law" is, or should
be. That reformulation of the disagreement is the main point of
this article.
The question whether to reveal knowledge of the whereabouts
of a client who has jumped bail or dodged the draft provides an
excellent example of how the seemingly different codes can run to-
gether in practical impact. Suppose such a client consulted a law-
yer and somehow the authorities learned of the consultation. As-
sume further, in order to simplify things, that the government
committed no fourth amendment or other constitutional violation
in the process of making this discovery. If the law in the particular
jurisdiction requires "all persons" with knowledge of the wherea-
bouts of a bail jumper to reveal that information, the following sce-
nario will unreel in wholly predictable fashion. The prosecutor will
demand that the lawyer divulge the information. The lawyer will
refuse, claiming attorney-client privilege and that the "law" makes
an exception for lawyers who have such information about their
clients. The prosecutor will then attempt to get a court order,
which the lawyer will resist, taking an interlocutory appeal if nec-
essary.70 In the end, all the lawyers' efforts will fail, the "law" will
obey law that lawyers would otherwise have.
68. ABA CODE, supra note 12, DR 4-101(C)(2).
69. See LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 18, rule 1.3.
70. The Lawyer's Code is commendably explicit on this point. It requires such "good
faith efforts to test the validity of the law, rule or order," before disclosure is even permit-
ted. LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 18, rule 1.3. This requirement can easily
be read into the other codes. Lawyers should do so, lest they too easily retreat from uncon-
fortable situations at the expense of their clients. Better yet, the Kutak Commission should
take its cue from the Lawyer's Code on this point and make the "good faith" requirement
19811
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
be confirmed by a court order explicitly rejecting the claim of priv-
ilege and explicitly commanding the lawyer to divulge the client's
location.
Unquestionably, many lawyers would feel caught at this point
in a moral and professional crisis. They would perceive the situa-
tion as one involving two conflicting duties, both high level, and
would agonizingly try to engage in a balancing process of some
kind to determine which duty should prevail. Furthermore, lawyers
and commentators who saw the hypothetical this way and, in addi-
tion, believed that the duty to the client was the more weighty of
the two, would lash out at the Discussion Draft for commanding
the "radical" solution of disclosure rather than disobedience.
As shown earlier, however, the disagreement is not properly
with the Discussion Draft. Rather, the disagreement is with the
conclusion of the court as to what the law is. Indeed, if the court
rules as hypothesized above, there is not even a dilemma, even for
a lawyer operating under one of the other supposedly discretionary
codes, for the court order extinguishes one horn of the dilemma,
the originally valid duty of silence. As the case concludes, a judge
is telling the lawyer that he will go to jail unless he reveals, while
the lawyer's code of professional ethics is telling him that he may
reveal. Obviously, he must reveal. Any other action would be to
confuse the lawyer's identity with that of his client and would be
professionally irresponsible.7 1
Legal principles outside the code thus convert "may reveal"
into "must reveal," just as surely as the moral obligation does in
the first two examples. The only difference is that many lawyers
faced with this third situation would not accept the law's com-
mand so readily, but would instead attack the Discussion Draft's
rule, as if it were the major impetus to disclosure, and as if things
would somehow be different under another code.
3. VOLUNTEERING THE WHEREABOUTS OF A FUGITIVE
The confidentiality problem can be made more difficult by
explicit in its next draft.
71. I recall reading, in a book of reminiscences, advice that went something like this: "If
it comes down to a situation in which either you or your client must go to jail, make sure it's
your client." Unfortunately, neither I nor the editors can find the source. I will take full
responsibility for the basic proposition in the text, however, though I do not put it as dra-
matically. Unnecessarily going to jail for a client is unprofessional, precisely because it dem-
onstrates that the lawyer has already allowed his independent judgment to be clouded by
emotional ties to the client.
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asking whether there are circumstances under which the lawyer
should volunteer information about the whereabouts of a fugitive.
It is useful to consider simultaneously two "companion" hypotheti-
cals. Assume that, in a well-publicized and fully litigated case, the
highest court of a state had recently confirmed the duty of a law-
yer to reveal such information when asked, as in the previous ex-
ample. Assume further that the court explicitly discussed what its
ruling would be in the case of a lawyer who knew but was not
asked, and in "well-considered dicta" stated that the result should
be the same because unless the lawyer volunteered the informa-
tion, he would be "obstructing justice" or "aiding escape." In the
second hypothetical, suppose that the highest court of a sister state
actually upheld the conviction of a lawyer for obstructing justice,
merely for failure to volunteer.
In both states, some lawyers would conclude that they now
had an affirmative duty to reveal the information voluntarily, and
they would do so. But many other lawyers would resist such a re-
sult-even in the second state-first by legal reasoning, then per-
haps through civil disobedience. Will the specific language of the
various codes affect the actions of real lawyers in these ethical
crises?7 1
On the face of it, the rules of the Discussion Draft seem to
create a much more powerful incentive to disclose than do the
other codes. The key rule, still 1.7(b),73 states that a lawyer must
reveal what he is required by law to reveal and in the hypothetical,
the highest court has just announced what is required by law. As-
suming a situation not legitimately distinguishable from the facts
discussed in dicta in the first case, or the actual holding of the
second case, the lawyer who refuses to volunteer the information
not only risks being implicated in crime, but also risks being disci-
plined for an ethical violation under the Discussion Draft.
But would the lawyer operating under the Lawyer's Code or
under the present Code feel less pressure to reveal the informa-
tion? True, he can argue that the Code gives him the discretion to
72. Only lawyers in the first state actually face a dilemma, although concededly lawyers
in both states would think so. Many lawyers in the second state would be tempted to ana-
lyze the situation as presenting two conflicting duties, as in the hypothetical involving an
affirmative order to divulge the whereabouts of a fugitive client. See text following note 70
supra. As demonstrated there, this analysis is wrong, for one of the duties has been extin-
guished, leaving only a single clearcut duty to obey the law, even if the law is distasteful.
The reason lawyers in the first state face a true dilemma is that there the "law" is not
clear, as the court has not ruled directly on the point.
73. MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 1, rule 1.7(b).
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disclose in "required by law" cases, and that in this case he
chooses not to disclose. Alternatively, he can argue that the case
law in the first state does not truly "require" him to volunteer the
information. But this does not negate the lawyer's potential crimi-
nal liability, which promises to be more severe and more public
than any discipline he might receive at the hands of an ethics com-
mittee. Because the lawyer knows that the committee cannot disci-
pline him for divulging, which is within his discretion and hence
permissible, but that he may have criminal liability if he does not
disclose, the pressure to divulge is still intense-not because of
anything in the codes, but because of the law existing outside of
the codes.
Furthermore, the lawyer who resists disclosure cannot be cer-
tain that failure to volunteer the information is permissible, even
under the codes. Lawyers have other duties that may be impli-
cated, even if the present Code and the Lawyer's Code appear to
vest discretion in the lawyer whether to comply with "law." Under
the present Code, for example, a lawyer "shall not engage in con-
duct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, 7 4 or "en-
gage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law."'7 5 More specifically, a lawyer "shall not conceal or
knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to re-
veal."' 76 Can the lawyer be sure which of the conflicting provi-
sions-the rules on permissive disclosure," or those that command
obedience to the law7 8-the ethics committee will choose to em-
phasize? The safer course, looked at strictly from the point of view
of the commands of the Code, may be to volunteer the
information.
Indeed, the annotations to the present Code, even given the
Code's seemingly permissive disclosure language, suggest that the
lawyer in such a situation has a duty to volunteer the information.
Footnote fifteen to the official version of DR 4-101(C),79 for exam-
ple, cites with apparent approval ABA Opinions 15580 and 156,8'
which were written during the reign of the old Canons of Ethics.
This footnote also quotes enough of the opinions to make it clear
74. ABA CODE, supra note 12, DR 1-102(A)(5).
75. Id. DR 1-102(A)(6).
76. Id. DR 7-102(A)(3) (emphasis added).
77. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
78. See text accompanying notes 74-76 supra.
79. ABA CODE, supra note 12, DR 4-101(C) n.15.
80. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 155 (1936).
81. Id. No. 156 (1936).
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that the lawyer must volunteer such information: because the law-
yer-client privilege does not apply, the duty to obey ,"law" puts the
lawyer on the same footing as any other citizen who has knowledge
of the whereabouts of a bail jumper or parole violator.82
Informal Opinion 1141,88 which was written in August 1970, is
a hopelessly conflicted and circular treatment of the same kind of
problem in a case involving a military deserter, but it eventually
reaches the same result. After stating that the critical question is
what is meant by the phrase "required by law," and that the Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics does not answer such questions of
law, the opinion nonetheless goes on to say that a lawyer must vol-
unteer information about his client's whereabouts if the consulta-
tion involved the deserter's wishes to continue to evade the law.
The opinion recognizes its own circularity, for it admits that one of
the key elements in defining the "law" is the applicability of the
attorney-client privilege. But its final analysis is similar to that of
Opinions 155 and 156; if the privilege does not apply, then Canon
48 is no bar to disclosure, and therefore disclosure is mandatory
because of other duties that arise from the commands of the Code
and other sources.
If the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics views the Code
as commanding voluntary disclosure, just as the rules of the Dis-
cussion Draft do, it is once again hard to paint the Discussion
Draft as radical,8" and hard to blame it for obligations that the
general law imposed at least ten years before the Draft's inception.
Even under the Lawyer's Code, supposedly the most anti-dis-
closure oriented code, there is considerable room for doubt as to a
lawyer's duty to volunteer the location of a fugitive client. This
doubt stems not only from the possibility that the authorities may
view the lawyer as an accomplice of the fugitive, but also from the
code language itself. Rule 3.4, for example, prohibits a lawyer from
"knowingly encourag[ing] a client to engage in illegal conduct,""
and rule 3.5 prohibits his knowing participation "in unlawfully
concealing or destroying evidence. '87 Does letting the client know
that you will not turn him in "encourage" him to stay at large? Is
the person of the fugitive "evidence" which must not be con-
82. ABA CODE, supra note 12, DR 4-101(C) n.15.
83. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 1141 (1970).
84. ABA CODE, supra note 12, Canon 4.
85. See note 19 supra.
86. LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 18, rule 3.4.
87. Id. rule 3.5.
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cealed? Perhaps not-but why should a lawyer take chances?
Although Illustrative Case 1(h)88 asserts without qualification
that a lawyer commits a disciplinary violation if he reveals his cli-
ent's whereabouts in a case of this kind, this is simply not so in the
second hypothetical given above. According to rule 1.3, there is a
violation only if the lawyer fails to exhaust "good faith efforts" to
challenge the law involved. 9 If the recent state supreme court case
is indistinguishable on any non-frivolous grounds, then there are
no further "efforts" to be exhausted and disclosure is no longer
prohibited, but is discretionary. Once, however, the lawyer discov-
ers that he may disclose the information and cannot be disciplined
or prosecuted for so doing, but that he runs a real risk of both if he
remains silent, the pressure to reveal the information is strong.
Perhaps there is just one twist of the screw less than under the
Discussion Draft, but probably not enough to make a practical dif-
ference in the case of lawyers who would be wavering in any event.
Once again, the practical effect of all of the code texts is
roughly the same; when considered in conjunction with existing
criminal law, they all put roughly the same amount of pressure on
lawyers to volunteer the information about a fugitive client's
whereabouts.90 Only the public will attach significance to surface
differences in language, or to incomplete explanations of a rule,
such as Illustrative Case 1(h).91 Any code, including the three
under consideration, that permits a lawyer to do what the law re-
quires, hands over to the courts de facto control of what lawyers
will actually do. Thus, while the drafters of the Lawyer's Code are
entitled to dislike exceptions to the principle of confidentiality,
and to argue against them in court or lobby against them in a legis-
lature, they are not entitled to write a code that pretends to ignore
them.
Finally, before turning to another controversial area, I should
note that although the practical effect of all three codes is to en-
courage voluntary disclosure in the examples given, surely there
are many lawyers, perhaps a majority, who would refuse to do so.
This does no damage to my thesis, but merely reinforces my claim
88. Id. Illustrative Case 1(h).
89. Id. rule 1.3.
90. The question of whether "the law" requires the lawyer to volunteer information
about the whereabouts of a client is reminiscent of the problem of whether "the law" re-
quires similar action when the lawyer comes into possession of the fruits or instrumentali-
ties of crime. See note 175 and accompanying text infra.
91. LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 18, Illustrative Case 1(h).
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that the precise wording of the contending codes will not greatly
influence a lawyer's action-other concerns will. Lawyers who re-
fuse to divulge the information voluntarily will not do so as a re-
sult of a carefully reasoned argument to themselves, based upon
the niceties of the code language just considered. They will refuse
despite the pressure to divulge, either because they think they will
not be discovered, or because they so violently disagree with the
pro-disclosure implications or commands of all three codes that
they will simply engage in civil disobedience.
There is, of course, only a fine line separating criminal or ille-
gal conduct from civil disobedience, a line having to do, in part,
with the actor's intent and attitude towards being discovered. True
civil disobedience has a well-established place in the process of law
development in the United States, for frequently open challenge to
a law is the only way to test its validity.92 In any event, it is suffi-
cient for purposes of this article to note that lawyers who engage
either in illegal activity or in civil disobedience of this kind will
likely find themselves equally out of favor with the ethics commit-
tees, regardless of the precise language with which the ethics com-
mittee is working.as Once again, lawyers will make the hard deci-
sions without a great deal of help from the codes.
B. Representing the Institutional Client
The second area in which the Discussion Draft has created
great controversy involves representation of entity clients, particu-
larly corporations." By daring to even contemplate the possibility
92. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969). But see Walker v.
City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). Recall too that lawyers Bates and O'Steen only
got their right to advertise their legal services vindicated in the Supreme Court of the
United States after they openly violated then-existing rules. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350
(1977).
93. Professor Hazard has made the point that it may sometimes be morally and profes-
sionally right to "run ethical risks," or even to violate a code of professional responsibility,
and that those who have the courage to make such a choice after mature consideration may
well be the most "responsible" of all. G. HAZARD, supra note 15, at 10. (Perhaps he would
agree that Bates and O'Steen were "responsible" in this sense. See note 92 supra.) He does
not shrink from the concept that conduct can be both "unlawful" and "right." G. HAzAMM,
supra nbte 15, at 11.
Still, as the Walker case shows, and the Shuttlesworth case implies, see note 92 supra,
the morally right but disobedient lawyer must accept punishment as part of the price of
being right, if the law does not accept his view of the law or his method of challenge to it.
94. In an article published in the fall of 1980, while the revision process was well under
way, Mr. Kutak indentified the three areas that had generated the most negative comment.
client confidences, representation of corporate clients, and a proposal, since dropped, to es-
tablish a mandatory and enforced duty for all lawyers to provide some level of uncompen-
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that corporate counsel might be forced to "blow the whistle"
outside the confines of the boardroom," the Discussion Draft
caused considerable unease and outrage.9" Once again, though,
careful line-by-line study of the rules of the Discussion Draft
shows that they are not a radical departure from the Code,97 and
that they do not markedly differ from the alternative proposed by
the American Trial Lawyers Foundation. Furthermore, significant
extra-code law exists or is developing in the securities and tax ar-
eas that threatens to preempt the codes as chief regulators of law-
yers' conduct, just as it has in the client confidences arena gener-
ally. This law makes lawyers potentially jointly liable for the torts
and crimes of their corporate clients and, in some circumstances,
imposes affirmative reporting requirements."
sated pro bono legal services. Kutak, The Next Step in Legal Ethics: Some Observations
About the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 30 CATH. UNIV. L. REv. 1 (1980).
95. But this situation would actually arise only in extremely limited circumstances. See
text accompanying note 112 infra.
96. The Wall Street Journal editorial entitled "A License to Squeal?," cited at note 20
supra, criticized this section of the Discussion Draft. Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1980, at 20, col. 1.
See also Kutak, supra note 94, at 10-11.
97. Because of the significant extra-code developments summarized in note 98 infra,
and because these developments all preceded the promulgation of even the first discussion
draft of the Model Rules, securities attorneys Dennis Block and Nancy Barton concluded
that "it is not at all clear that the Model Rules significantly change the Code and the ABA's
interpretation thereof with respect to the tension between the disclosure requirements of
the federal securities laws and the confidentiality requirement of the attorney-client rela-
tionship." Block & Barton, Securities Litigation, 8 SEc. REG. L.J. 333, 343 (1981).
98. For a good account of the developing law and the tensions it creates for the corpo-
rate lawyer, see Block & Barton, supra note 97.
The authors considered the following cases and reports:
1) SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978). In this
case, the court found lawyers civilly liable as aiders and abettors for maintaining silence and
allowing a merger to go through when they had knowledge of material inaccuracies in the
financial data submitted by their client.
2) Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). In Chiarella the Court reversed the
conviction of a printer who had learned about a pending takeover bid and had used the
information to his trading advantage, on the theory that he had no duty to disclose. The
question is then properly raised whether a lawyer would have such a duty, and if so, from
where it might arise. The authors discuss a post-Chiarella prosecution of a lawyer before the
District Court for the Southern District of New York. United States v. Hall, [1980 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) $ 97,675 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 1980). See also SEC v. Hall,
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) $ 97,292 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 1980). The
issue in Hall is circular in a familiar way: the lawyer either has a duty not to disclose, and so
is not liable under Chiarella, or he has a duty to present stockholders that grows out of his
relationship to "their" entity, and breaches that duty by maintaining silence.
3) In re Carter, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. RaP. (CCH) $ 82,165. In Carter, the
Administrative Law Judge recommended that the SEC sanction two lawyers who did not go
to the board of directors after management repeatedly declined to follow their advice to
make further disclosures in a prospectus. Although the lawyers' conduct was clearly unpro-
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A major and valid criticism of the Code has been its poor, al-
most non-existent, treatment of the critical question, "Who is the
client?"9 in the corporate or other institutional context. There is
no disagreement at all among the three codes, however, on a formal
definition of the "client"-it is the entity itself,100 even though the
entity acts and receives legal advice via highly placed human
agents. The codes differ only as to the kind of concrete advice that
they give to lawyers on how to handle the conflict of interest
problems that arise when one group of agents is at odds with other
fessional, the SEC ultimately dismissed the disciplinary proceedings since the SEC had not
then "adopted or endorsed standards of professional conduct which would have applied to
respondents' activities during the period here in question, and since generally accepted
norms of professional conduct . . .did not unambiguously cover the situation in which
[these lawyers] found themselves. . . ." In re Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981) (No. 3-5464).
4) The report of an ABA Committee that takes the view that in clear cases of known
misstatements of material matter, counsel has a duty to come forward, because the "reveal
fraud" provisions of DR 7-102(B)(1) convert the discretion to reveal secrets contained in
Canon 4 into a mandatory duty (a conversion mechanism described in the text accompany-
ing notes 131-35 infra, and similar to the "required by law" conversion described at text
accompanying notes 70-71 supra). ABA Committee on Counsel Responsibility Liability, The
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Responsibility of Lawyers Engaged in Securi-
ties Law Practice: A Report by the Committee on Counsel Responsibility & Liability, 30
Bus. LAW 1289, 1301 (1975).
5) A Policy Statement of the ABA that expressed concern that SEC attempts to
strengthen affirmative disclosure requirements could not be reconciled with the general duty
of confidentiality, but that urged that if further requirements were to be imposed, they be
imposed by statute. ABA, Statement of Policy Adopted by the ABA re Responsibilities and
Liabilities of Lawyers in Advising with Respect to the Compliance by the Clients with
Laws Administered by the SEC, 31 Bus. LAW 543 (1975).
6) The "Georgetown Proposals." These were far-reaching proposals drafted by the In-
stitute for Public Interest Representation of Georgetown University Law Center, and issued
for public comment by the SEC, without a recommendation. Sec. Exch. Act Release No.
16045, 44 Fed. Reg. 44,881 (1979). They would have required corporations to instruct their
counsel to engage in certain disclosures, and would have required corporations to disclose
the circumstances under which counsel either resigned or were fired. Id. The SEC rejected
the proposals because of their impracticality and their effect on attorney-client relation-
ships, and because of the initatives in this area taken by the legal profession, especially the
discussions concerning the Model Rules. Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 16769, [1979-1980
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,501, reprinted in 45 Fed. Reg. 30, 454
(1980).
I believe it is fair to say that 1) the area is unsettled and volatile; 2) there is an overall
movement toward the disclosure end of the spectrum; 3) adoption of the Model Rules would
significantly speed up that movement; and 4) the more the law develops in this direction the
less significant all codes of ethics will become as chief regulators of conduct, even if initially
such a code aided in law development.
99. See G. HAZARD, supra note 15, at 7, 43-57.
100. LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 18, rule 2.5 (by implication, as
explained in the commentary); ABA CODE, supra note 12, EC 5-18; MODEL RULs (Discus-
sion Draft), supra note 1, rule 1.13(a).
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agents of the same entity. But interestingly enough, even though
the substance of the advice offered differs, the three codes are alike
in that they each are content to limit themselves to giving advice
on how to proceed, and do not issue more clear-cut substantive
commands, as they do not hesitate to do in other areas. Even
where code language appears to be mandatory, the accompanying
commentary and examples, as well as other internal clues, all com-
bine to soften the directives considerably.
The present Code contains no mandatory provisions directly
applicable to this subject. EC 5-18 simply asserts that the lawyer
"owes his allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, direc-
tor, employee, representative or other person connected with the
entity," without further amplification. 10' A studious attorney could
perhaps find mandatory directions in Canon 5 of the Code under
the general rubric of impairing "independent professional judg-
ment," 2 but the linguistic fit is not comfortable.
DR 5-105(A), for example, speaks to the problem of when a
lawyer should decline proffered employment, if the new employ-
ment would create a conflict of interest. It could be said that this
rule applies when a director or officer of a corporation confides in
counsel and seeks help, for the lawyer already represents the cor-
porate entity. But the very problem presented by many of the con-
flicts scenarios that arise in this context is that the trusting rela-
tionship between the lawyer and the entity's human representative
has already developed over a long period of time, during which the
lawyer technically has been representing only the entity. The co-
nundrum can be solved by having the lawyer assume that past
communications from the representative have been strictly "on be-
half of" the entity, but that now the person is presenting himself
as a potential new client in his own right. Under such a reading,
the lawyer probably is bound to reject this new client and demand
that he get counsel of his own, if there is a serious split in legal
interests.
Unfortunately, cutting off certain individuals from the assis-
tance of corporate counsel may be part of the problem, not the
solution. There is, first of all, the problem of frustrated expecta-
tions: if the would-be client confided as if he were the client,
revealing his secrets would violate the main policy behind the
101. ABA CODE, supra note 12, EC 5-18.
102. ABA CODE, supra note 12, Canon 5. The "axiomatic" statement of Canon 5 is that
"A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client." Id.
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confidentiality principle, which is to encourage maximum commu-
nication to lawyers about legal problems. On the other hand, if the
lawyer withholds the information on behalf of this would-be client,
great damage may be done to the existing entity client. The situa-
tion becomes considerably more difficult when the "person" at
odds with the interests of the entity is not simply a single defal-
cating vice-president, but management generally, or the whole
board of directors. Is the "entity" in this situation a majority of
the stockholders, or is it that same board of directors, which may
have legal authority to define what is in the best interests of the
entity? In practical terms, how often can we expect house counsel
to turn away from the group that hired him and continues to pay
his salary, in favor, of an ill-defined "entity"?
DR 5-105(B) addresses the lawyer's obligation not to continue
multiple employments when impossible conflicts develop. Techni-
cally, this provision should not apply at all, for rigorous analysis
would insist that the lawyer never had more than one client in the
first place. Nonetheless, the problem of disentangling what has in
practical terms been a multiple representation will be just as diffi-
cult as in the "profferred employment" situation just discussed. 105
The present Code, then, has little to say about the realities of
intracorporate conflicts that can blossom overnight. The entity is
the client, the lawyer must serve the client, and the lawyer must
not let others impair his independent professional judgment. With
those easy truths as their only gospel, lawyers must develop on
their own a response to these conflicts. With such an amorphous
standard, it is extremely unlikely that the fear of discipline will
itself be a significant inducement or deterrent to action.
The Lawyer's Code gives some sound practical advice on han-
dling intracorporate conflicts before they develop, but the substan-
tive approach is essentially the same as that of the present Code.
Rule 2.5 of the Lawyer's Code provides that when a corporation
hires a lawyer, the lawyer shall warn the board of directors about
103. DR 5-105(C) allows the lawyer to take on a new client under DR 5-105(A), or to
continue multiple employment under DR 5-105(B), if two conditions are met. All clients
must consent after full disclosure of the potential conflict, which is likely to be difficult
given the confidences problem, and it must be "obvious" that the lawyer can "adequately"
represent each. Id. DR 5-105(C). Even assuming that "adequately" means "with the full zeal
required by Canon 7," it is difficult to comprehend how a lawyer sensitive enough to have
thought seriously about a conflict could ever convince himself or his clients that there is
"obviously" no problem. It is like the old chestnut about the difficulty of not thinking about
a polar bear with a polka-dotted bow tie.
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possible future conflicts of interest,104 and ask in advance how the
board wants them handled. The Lawyer's Code thus continues the
idea that the entity is the (only) client, but is more explicit that
the board (alone) speaks for the entity, even when conflicts within
the entity are involved.
The commentary to rule 2.5 explains that if the board requires
the lawyer to report fully to the board, officers will be on notice
and will not speak to the lawyer against their own personal inter-
ests. Or, the commentary continues, if the board prefers to en-
courage fuller communication between the lawyer and other corpo-
rate agents, it can state in advance that the board should not be
told about officers' confidences even if the information affects the
corporation. 10 5 This advance warning mechanism can indeed pre-
vent many intracorporate conflicts, especially those that involve
frustrated expectations of secrecy. But substantively, the lawyer
may still be at sea, for he may still have a problem deciding where
the client's actual interests lie.
For example, take a situation in which the board has decided
that it does not want to know what the lawyer knows, and the
lawyer finds out about a fraudulent marketing practice perpetrated
by two or three top officers in one of the company's regional offices.
The board had told the lawyer to maintain the officers' confi-
dences, but will the entity be well served if the fraud is ultimately
revealed in headline-creating litigation? Presumably the stockhold-
ers will in retrospect have something to say about that, and will
claim that the board's studied ignorance was not in the best inter-
est of the corporation. Indeed, as discussed below,10e the lawyer
may have a duty to disobey the board, in order to better serve the
entity."'7
104. LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 18, rule 2.5. It is ironic that the
Lawyer's Code contains this Miranda feature-a hallmark of the Discussion Draft. See
notes 115-19 and accompanying text infra.
105. LAwYER's CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 18, at 202-04.
106. See note 109 and accompanying text infra.
107. This is not a necessary result. It is possible that the stockholders are wrong and
that the interests of the corporation may actually be better served by continuing the illegal-
ity. Such might be the case, for example, if the unlawful conduct is the violation of a minor
regulation, the chances of discovery are only slight, and the cost of corrective action is high.
Such a scenario was suggested at a panel discussion on the Discussion Draft at the Associa-
tion of American Law Schools meeting in San Antonio last January.
Whether the organization would in fact benefit from continuation of the illegality is a
difficult question, the answer to which depends on the business and moral judgment of the
relevant corporate decisionmakers involved. The lawyer's responsibility is to develop a
mechanism to discover what are the actual "best interests" of the entity when the organiza-
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The above example demonstrates that the Lawyer's Code sim-
ply begs the question of who prevails in a clash between the board
and the entity by assuming that the board is the entity and that
the board can therefore always decide in advance on a proper
course of conduct for the entity's lawyer. The question-begging is
even more pronounced in the more difficult case, in which the law-
yer becomes convinced that the board itself created the legal
problems that the entity is about to face. Rule 2.1 requires the law-
yer to give "undivided fidelity" to the client's interests "as per-
ceived by the client,"' 08 but that is a tough order to fill if the client
is not itself "undivided." Furthermore, there is a serious question
in that kind of case as to who is the eyes and ears of the entity,
capable of "perceiving" anything on its behalf.
Although it still leaves much unanswered, the Lawyer's Code's
solution for intracorporate conflicts is an improvement over the
present Code's solution, which is to ignore the problem and leave
lawyers to work out a response for themselves. But despite some
mandatory-sounding language in parts of the Lawyer's Code, it
also gives the overall impression of being little more than helpful
practical advice. The section states that the lawyer shall give the
advance warnings described and receive the instructions on what
to do, but there are no directions about the extent to which the
lawyer must follow those instructions when the situations for
which they were designed actually arise. There is nothing prevent-
ing a lawyer from deciding that in a particular situation-such as
in the hypothetical just posed-the interests of the entity as a
whole require him to disobey the prior instructions of the board.
Indeed, if the lawyer determines that the interests of the entity are
in fact opposed to the board's position, 10 it may be his duty to
disobey the board, because of the duty imposed by rule 2.1 to be
loyal to the client.
Again, it seems hard to imagine that the precise language of
the Lawyer's Code, or any other code, will be uppermost in the
tion is internally split on this question.
After performing this first difficult task, the lawyer must still resolve the question of
whether confidences of a client involving crime or other wrongdoing must or may be re-
vealed. That question is largely controlled by the "required by law" provisions of all three of
the codes. See notes 66-71 and accompanying text supra.
108. LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 18, rule 2.1.
109. It is an unusual task for the lawyer to determine where the client's best interests
lie, but when the client is itself incapable of making this decision because it is divided on
the question, it may be the responsibility of the lawyer to resolve the conflict on behalf of
the client. See note 107 and accompanying text supra.
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mind of a lawyer facing one of these difficult situations. Even more
clearly, it is difficult to believe that a lawyer actually could be dis-
ciplined merely for failing to solicit advance instructions from the
board. Yet that is the only actually mandatory provision of the
Lawyer's Code on this subject. Furthermore, rule 2.5 is one of the
very few in the entire Lawyer's Code that is not accompanied by a
hard-hitting Illustrative Case that ends with a flat assertion that
the lawyer has or has not committed a disciplinary violation. This
suggests that the draftsmen were less sure of themselves on this
point and intended more to advise than to command.
The Discussion Draft's approach to the problem of represent-
ing an institutional client is also an improvement over the simplis-
tic nonapproach of the present Code, but it still leaves much to the
discretion of the involved lawyer, and also, therefore, seems more
like practical advice than harsh command. Rule 1.13 first restates
the basic definition that all three codes share: the entity is the cli-
ent. The rule then postulates a conflict and directs the lawyer to
consider a series of measures, of escalating seriousness and involv-
ing higher and higher levels of corporate responsibility, in his at-
tempt to solve the problem.110 Only if all other attempts fail is the
lawyer allowed to go outside the corporation to resolve the conflict
and even then the lawyer is specifically directed to consider "the
best interest of the organization." '
The Discussion Draft thus gives more guidance to the lawyer
than the other codes because it specifically allows him to reach the
result postulated for extreme situations under the Lawyer's Code:
the lawyer might be forced to conclude that even the board of di-
rectors is not acting in the best interests of the organization as a
whole, and he therefore must disobey the board in order to be fully
true to his one and only client. But while the Discussion Draft
gives more practical and more comprehensive guidance, it too is
clearly couched in nonmandatory terms, in recognition of the fact
that situations of this kind never involve easy answers, but always
involve a good faith balancing of competing interests. Discretion-
ary language abounds in rule 1.13: it is activated if there is a likeli-
hood of "significant harm" to the entity; the lawyer shall use "rea-
sonable efforts" to prevent the harm; and the lawyer shall give
"due consideration to the-seriousness of the legal violation" and
choose steps "designed to minimize disruption and the risk of dis-
110. MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 1, rule 1.13.
111. Id. rule 1.13(c).
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closing confidences.M12
Under any one of the codes, lawyers suddenly caught up in
intra-entity conflicts will work them out as best they can, seeking
guidance from other lawyers, from the body of conflicts of interest
law, and from their own common sense and sense of rightness. The
codes are helpful in varying degrees in suggesting practical solu-
tions, but in the great majority of cases, a code will not likely con-
trol the lawyer's decision to act or forbear.
Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that once the lawyer
sorts through the internal conflicts of the entity client, he will still
be under considerable pressure from extra-code law on the merits.
112. The full text of the rule is as follows:
1.13 AN ORGANIZATION AS THE CLIENT
(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organi-
zation as distinct from its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders,
or other constituents.
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee, or other
person associated with the organization is engaged in or intends action, or a re-
fusal to act, that is a violation of law and is likely to result in significant harm to
the organization, the lawyer shall use reasonable efforts to prevent the harm. In
determining the appropriate measures, the lawyer shall give due consideration to
the seriousness of the legal violation and its consequences, the scope and nature
of the lawyer's representation, the responsibility in the organization of the per-
son involved, and the policies of the organization concerning such matters. The
measures taken shall be designed to minimize disruption and the risk of disclos-
ing confidences. Such measures may include:
(1) Asking reconsideration of the matter;
(2) Seeking a separate legal opinion on the matter for presentation to
appropriate authority in'the organization;
(3) Referring the matter to higher authority in the organization, includ-
ing, if necessary, referral to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the
organization as determined by applicable law.
(c) If, despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b), the
highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon action,
or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of the law and is likely to result in
substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer may take further remedial ac-
tion, including disclosure of client confidences to the extent necessary, if the
lawyer reasonably believes such action to be in the best interest of the
organization.
(d) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its di-
rectors, officers, members, or shareholders subject to the provisions of rule 1.8. A
lawyer undertaking such dual representation shall disclose that fact to an appro-
priate official of the organization other than the person so represented.
(e) When a shareholder or member of an organization brings a derivative
action, the lawyer for the organization may act as its advocate only as permitted
by rule 1.8.
(f) In dealing with an organization's officials and employees, a lawyer shall
explain the identity of the client when necessary to avoid embarrassment or un-
fairness to them.
MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 1, rule 1.13.
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In the securities and tax areas particularly, legal requirements
have developed or are developing that substantially circumscribe
the lawyer's freedom of choice.' 8 Just as in the "required by law"
examples involving the fugitive client,"' this developing law will
often preempt the practical effect of whatever code for lawyers is
adopted.
There is a final similarity between the Discussion Draft and
the Lawyer's Code treatment of the intra-entity conflict problem
that is particularly ironic. The last subsection of rule 1.13 of the
Discussion Draft, which requires the lawyer to explain to officers
and employees the identity of the true client "when necessary to
avoid embarrassment or unfairness to them,"' 15 mirrors exactly the
"advance warning" solution of the Lawyer's Code." 6 Both codes
thus accept the possibility that the lawyer may effectively warn off
individuals whose interests conflict with those of the organization
they are supposed to be serving, so that they will cease giving use-
ful information to the lawyer.
These provisions are actually specific applications of the more
generalized "Miranda warnings" feature that many find objection-
able in the Discussion Draft.17 Rule 1.4(b) requires a lawyer to
advise a client about "relevant legal and ethical limitations to
which the lawyer is subject," but apparently only when the lawyer
"has reason to believe that the client may expect assistance not
permitted by law or the Rules of Professional Conduct."" 8 This
113. See cases and articles cited at note 98 supra.
114. See notes 70-71 and accompanying text supra.
115. MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 1, rule 1.13(f).
116. LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 18, rule 2.5; see note 93 'upra.
117. The unedited transcript of Professor Freedman's talk at this symposium indicates
that there was laughter in the audience when he said: "The Model Rules at one point re-
quired the lawyer to give a Miranda warning to his own client-not the best way to establish
a relationship of trust and confidence." Address by Monroe H. Freedman, University of
Miami Law Review Sixth Annual Baron de Hirsch Meyer Lecture Series (Apr. 3, 1981). The
requirement does not seem so odd to me when one considers that its purpose, as well as the
purpose of the real Miranda rule, is to warn people about'the true state of affairs, when they
have reason not to be aware of the truth. I suspect that Professor Freedman's real objection
is that he dislikes the fact that there is an element of adversariness in the lawyer-client
relationship. See text accompanying notes 165-70 infra. For a discussion of lawyer-client
mistrust, see notes 248-54 and accompanying text infra.
Each time I have taught the course in Professional Responsibility, the class has inde-
pendently suggested Miranda warnings be given to clients in various conflicts of interest
situations (such as the supposedly "uncontested" divorce), before the class was exposed to
the Discussion Draft. Even the Code may be thought of as containing a Miranda require-
ment, in DR 5-105(C), which requires that fully counseled clients consent to joint represen-
tation. See ABA CODE, supra note 1, DR 5-105(C).
118. MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 1, rule 1.4(b).
[Vol. 35:739
THREE PEAS IN A POD
provision is often criticized as introducing an unhealthy gust of
chilling air into the lawyer-client relationship at its very inception,
making the relationship partly trusting but partly adversarial as
well. The irony is not only that the supposedly "pro-client" Law-
yer's Code also contains a derivative of this Discussion Draft fea-
ture, but also that it appears there in fuller force, at least in the
entity representation context. Whereas Discussion Draft rule 1.4(b)
requires this kind of warning to a new client only after the lawyer
has made a judgment that the client is one who needs to be disa-
bused of the idea that lawyers will do anything and everything for
a client, the Lawyer's Code requires such warnings in every entity
client case, in effect assuming that conflicts are likely to develop.11 '
The Miranda feature of the Discussion Draft, though ironi-
cally not as forceably put in the limited context of representing
entity clients, is nonetheless more generally applicable, and is in
fact one of the lynchpins of the Kutak Commission's work. Though
concededly producing some awkward moments, and perhaps even
killing off some budding lawyer-client relationships, the Miranda
feature is a main mechanism for educating the public about law-
yers, and telling the truth about the profession. It is deliberately
designed to eliminate, over a period of time, the "hired gun"
mythology.
Before returning to discussion of the necessity of a Miranda
feature for any sound code, I will discuss one more controversial
area-one that, not by accident, implicates this feature most
clearly: what should a lawyer do when his client is about to commit
perjury, and the lawyer knows it?
C. The Client Perjury Provisions: Participation, Disclosure,
and Withdrawal
Anyone who wanted to debunk the point of the title of this
article would surely turn first to the client perjury provisions of
each code of professional responsibility under consideration.
Where else, after all, could one expect to find a more clearcut bat-
tleground for the competing ideas? Either the idea of litigation as
a search for truth and justice is supreme,120 or the adversarial ideal
119. LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 18, rule 2.5.
120. Then Judge Frankel's article is probably the best known defense of this position.
Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975). For a
similar defense of openness in negotiations, as opposed to litigation, see Rubin, A Causerie
on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REv. 577 (1975).
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is paramount. 21 Lawyers must either sacrifice perjurious clients
who try to abuse the system, or tolerate and shelter some abusive
clients so that future clients will have enough faith in the system
to confide in their lawyers in the first place.
A quick reading of the codes will reward the debunker. The
Discussion Draft does appear to say that a lawyer will be disci-
plined if he knowingly presents the perjured testimony of a cli-
ent,122 while the Lawyer's Code appears to say that the lawyer will
be disciplined unless he does so. 123 The Code appears to be true to
form also-internally inconsistent and circular at the same time."2 4
A more careful reading reveals that the stereotype holds up
only with respect to the Code provisions. This is true especially
when those provisions are considered together with the equally un-
clear pronouncements of the roughly contemporaneous Standards
Relating to the Defense Function (the Defense Function Stan-
dards).125 The Discussion Draft, on the other hand, is not signifi-
cantly more "anti-client" than the Lawyer's Code, especially in the
all-important criminal law context. In some significant testing sce-
narios, the Discussion Draft is actually more protective of the lying
client's secrets.126
As originally drafted in 1969, DR 7-102(B)(1) of the Code pro-
vided that a lawyer who discovered that his client had clearly "per-
petrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal" should demand rectifi-
cation by the client, and if that failed, the lawyer was required to
121. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 51, at 27-78; Freedman, Professional Responsibility
of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469
(1955). Professor Freedman, Reporter for the Lawyer's Code, also sharply criticized Judge
Frankel's article. Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1060
(1974).
122. MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 1, rule 3.1(a)(3). This rule states: "A
lawyer shall not [except in certain circumstances in criminal cases] offer evidence that the
lawyer is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt is false . I..." Id.
123. Illustrative Case 1(i) of the Lawyer's Code states: "The lawyer does not present
the client's [false] testimony as she otherwise would. . . .The lawyer has committed disci-
plinary violations." LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 18, Illustrative Case 1(i).
124. See notes 126-37 and accompanying text infra.
125. The ABA adopted the original set of standards during the period 1968-73. See
ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINIS-
TRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Standards]. The House of
Delegates adopted a second edition of the Standards. ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Standards]. This book contains the Standards
and accompanying history and commentary.
126. This is so because the Discussion Draft's provisions for disclosure of client perjury
apply only when the lawyer knows "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the client has lied or
will do so. See notes 143-52 and accompanying text infra.
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"reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal.111 7 When cou-
pled with the strictures of DR 7-102(A)(4) and (A)(7), which for-
bade the knowing use of perjured testimony or assisting a client's
known illegal conduct, DR 7-102(B)(1) seemed to handle the prob-
lem of client perjury rather easily-keep it out of court, even in a
criminal case, and even if it meant blowing the whistle on a lying
client after the fact.1 28
The original 1971 Defense Function Standards took a some-
what different view. The commentary baldly stated that DR 7-
102(B) did not "embrace" the giving of false testimony in a crimi-
nal case, despite the lack of any qualifying language in the rule.' 2
With that point of view expressed in the commentary, one might
expect to find that the Standards counseled the unrestrained pres-
entation of perjured testimony on behalf of a criminal defendant.
But one looks in vain for such directions. Instead, the Defense
Function Standards adopted what was presented as a compromise
position: counsel faced with client perjury must withdraw if possi-
ble, and, when this is not possible, counsel must neither question
his client nor argue his testimony to the jury. Rather, the client
must be cut adrift to "tell his story" while the lawyer looks on,
stony faced and silent.130 The theory was that the lawyer was not
violating DR 7-102(A)(4) or (A)(7), because he was not "using"
127. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1969). Just how
"clear" the perjury must be is nowhere defined and little discussed in the literature. There
is the possibility that all such disclosure provisions are disguised non-disclosure provisions
because of a lawyer's ability to circumvent "knowledge" of the perjury. See text following
note 151 infra.
128. The Code does not explicitly discuss the option or duty to withdraw in the context
of client perjury. DR 2-110(B)(2), however, requires withdrawal if the lawyer sees an "obvi-
ous" violation of'the Disciplinary Rules on the horizon, and DR 2-110(C) permits with-
drawal in similar circumstances. ABA CODE, supra note 12, DR 1-110(B)(2), (C).
Cases that actually implicate the Disciplinary Rules cited in the text will therefore be
the rare cases of total surprise, or cases in which the client's intention to commit perjury
comes to light at trial or immediately preceding trial, when it is too late to withdraw accord-
ing to the practice in most criminal courts. In all other realistic cases, the lawyer already will
have withdrawn, or should have.
129. 1973 Standards, supra note 125, Standard 1.7, Comment.
130. 1979 Standards, supra note 125, Standard 4-7.7. Significantly, this section was the
only one that the ABA House of Delegates did not adopt in 1979. The question of what to
do when the client lies was referred instead to the Kutak Commission, which was then near-
ing the end of its first phase of work. The Discussion Draft rejects this approach completely.
See text following note 142 infra.
It should be noted that Standard 4-7.7 only applies in extremely limited circumstances:
when the client has admitted the perjury to the lawyer and the lawyer has independently
"established" the admissions. See text accompanying notes 141-60 infra for a discussion of
disclosure devices that never actually arise in practice.
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perjured testimony, nor was he "assisting" illegal conduct. And as
DR 7-102(B)(1) had been dismissed by fiat, the lawyer was not
forced to take affirmative corrective action either. As almost every
commentator now agrees, 181 this compromise was no compromise
at all, because in a real life court room, counsel's sudden change of
style would be a fully effective, though implicit, disclosure of the
perjury.
Although the Standards thus spoke with two voices, the offi-
cial Code contained unequivocal language prohibiting the lawyer
from presenting perjured testimony and requiring disclosure.
Then, in 1974, the ABA amended the Disciplinary Rule to add an
exception that accomplished a complete reversal of the thrust of
the Rule: the lawyer must reveal the fraud of the client "except
when the information [establishing the fraud] is protected as a
privileged communication."'3 " The next year, Formal Opinion 341
confirmed this about-face by interpreting the exception extremely
broadly, stating that the words "privileged communication" were
meant to include not only information coming to the lawyer's at-
tention via the client, but also information coming from third par-
ties, unless "not in connection with" representation of the cli-
ent."'I3 Since the lawyer would normally not even know of the
client but for the professional relationship, it is virtually impossi-
ble to imagine a case in which DR 7-102(B)(1), as amended and as
interpreted, would require disclosure.13 4 But even this does not end
131. Professor Wolfram dryly remarks that the proposal "has not found wide accept-
ance." Wolfram, Client Perjury: The Kutak Commission and the Association of Trial Law-
yers on Lawyers, Lying Clients and the Adversary System, 1980 AM. B. FOUNDATION
RESEARCH J. 964, 974 n.58. The proposal is associated with then Judge Warren Burger, who
was chairman of the committee writing the original Defense Function Standards. Professor
Freedman asserts that Judge Burger was the only advocate of this solution. Freedman, Per-
jury: The Lawyer's Trilemma, 1 LITIGATION 26, 29 (1974). This is obviously somewhat of an
exaggeration, because at least a majority of the drafting committee agreed with Judge
Burger.
132. ABA CODE, supra note 12, DR 7-102(B)(1).
133. Opinion 341, supra note 48.
134. Professor Wolfram traced the entire checkered career of the client perjury provi-
sions through a series of conflicting opinions. Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REv.
809 (1977). He states that trying to conjure up situations in which there would be a duty to
disclose, under the Committee's reading, "has become something of a law school parlor
game." Id. at 837 n.106. My students and I have played and lost.
Professor Rotunda latched on to another sentence in the same paragraph in Opinion
341 and showed that the now familiar circularity might still be present. Rotunda, Officers,
Directors, and Their Professional Advisors-Rights, Duties, and Liabilities, 1 CORP. L.
REv. 34 (1978). Amended DR 7-102(B)(1) still mandates disclosure of that which is not
privileged under Canon 4, but Canon 4 allows disclosure of what the law requires the lawyer
to reveal, or of the intention of the client to commit a crime, including perjury. See id. at
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the matter. Lawyers practicing in only one state may be unaware
that only twelve states have adopted the 1974 amendment.185 Pre-
sumably this means that Formal Opinion 341 is completely irrele-
vant in the other states, and in those states the 1969 version of DR
7-102(B)(1) still controls and unequivocally requires an attorney to
reveal his client's perjury.
Meanwhile, the Defense Function Standards persisted in the
so-called compromise position of neither disclosing the perjury nor
actively assisting it, but withdrew the commentary that expressed
the view that DR 7-102(B)(1) did not apply to criminal cases.186
That commentary was never authoritative with respect to the
Code, but its withdrawal caused further confusion as to what was
proper conduct for a lawyer. The amended Code, as interpreted,
prohibited disclosure; the Defense Function Standards prohibited
disclosure, but counseled action that virtually guaranteed it. At the
same time, nearly seventy-five percent of the states adhered to a
mandatory disclosure rule, at least on paper.8 7
The question of how this bewildering array of conflicting Code
38-39.
The opinion elsewhere recognizes this circularity, and implies that the purpose of the
1974 amendment was to cut the knot and end up with a nondisclosure rule. Opinion 341,
supra note 48, at 2-3. Professor Rotunda has thus probably been too generous in allowing
play to Opinion 341. That is not the point, however. The point is that if two experts in the
field can disagree over the impact of an opinion that was supposed to clarify an amendment
which was not clear upon first reading, it is unfair to expect practicing lawyers to perform
this kind of fine textual analysis on a daily basis, especially upon pain of a disciplinary
proceeding if they err.
135. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY STATE, supra note 13, at 761L-802L.
136. The ABA section on Criminal Justice presented the Standard stating the compro-
mise position, 4-7.7, to the ABA House of Delegates, but the House of Delegates did not
adopt it. Standard 4-3.7(d) states that a lawyer may reveal the intention of his client to
commit a crime, thus echoing DR 4-101(C)(3), and then states that the lawyer must do so in
cases of danger to life, thus echoing Model Rule 1.7(b). 1979 Standard, oupra note 125, at
Standard 4-3.7(d). This Standard originally contained a cross-reference to the problem of
client perjury and the Standard 4-7.7 solution, but the current version does not contain such
a reference.
137. The qualification "at least on paper" is necessary, because some state ethics com-
mittees or supreme courts may reach the nondisclosure result even in the face of unequivo-
cal language stating otherwise. Indiana Ethics Opinion 1979-1, for example, states that the
original version of DR 7-102(B)(1) does not mandate disclosure of the perjury if to do so
would reveal a confidence or secret of the client. INDIANA ETHICS OPINIONS, OPINION 1979-1.
Professor Freedman has argued that even without the amendment, DR 7-102(B)(1)
should not apply to criminal defense lawyers, because of the constitutional right to counsel
and due process and because otherwise a guilty client could not testify, thus implicating the
fifth amendment also. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 51, at 29.
These possible constitutional implications of a disclosure rule are discussed briefly later
in this article. See text accompanying note 158 infra.
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language and interpretations of it would affect the conduct of
lawyers in this most controversial area prompted an anonymous
survey of Washington, D.C. lawyers in 1972.1"' It is well known,
of course, that talk is cheap, and that anonymous talk is even
more of a bargain. Still, the results of the survey were overwhelm-
ing enough to mean something, for at a time when the Code ap-
peared to unequivocally require disclosure, with no apparent ex-
ception for criminal cases, ninety percent of the questioned
attorneys stated that they would call the defendant as a witness,
knowing that he was going to lie, and would question him in a nor-
mal fashion.18 9 This suggests that responding to client perjury is
one of the areas where the beliefs of individual lawyers are so
firmly held that much more than code language will be needed to
influence their conduct. It suggests further that regardless of how
strongly any new set of rules imposes a duty to disclose, there will
be significant civil disobedience, at least in the early years.
What does the Discussion Draft say, then, about this most
sensitive area? Does it doggedly press forward, demanding that
lawyers betray their clients at wholesale, even though the drafters
must know full well that such a command would be disobeyed fre-
quently? It does not. Although the basic rule is indeed one of
mandatory disclosure,"' ° even at the expense of admitted client
confidences, the impact of this rule is softened considerably in
three important ways, and in practice may be tantamount to a
nondisclosure rule.' 4 ' Furthermore, in most cases involving client
perjury, the lawyer will have withdrawn before the crisis point. 4 2
First, the Kutak Commission repudiated as barely worthy of
serious discussion the compromise position of the Defense Func-
tion Standards. Section 4-7.7 of the Standards, which states the
compromise, was the only section that the ABA House of Delegates
did not adopt in February, 1979.1'1 This section of the Standards
138. Friedman, Professional Responsibility in D.C.: A Survey, 1972 Res Ipsa Loquitur
60.
139. Id.
140. Model Rule 3.1(a): "A lawyer shall not: . . . (3) Except as provided in paragraph
(f), offer evidence that the lawyer is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt is false, or offer
without suitable explanation evidence that the lawyer knows is substantially misleading."
MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 1, rule 3.1(a).
141. It may be argued that the Model Rule is unrealistically narrow-so narrow, in fact,
that cases to which it applies will never arise and that it is therefore in effect a nondis-
closure rule, or alternatively that it is a disclosure rule designed to be evaded. See note 151
infra.
142. See note 163 infra.
143. 1979 Standards, supra note 125, Standard 4-7.7.
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was referred to the Kutak Commission for special reconsideration
in light of its obvious relationship to the Commission's overall
task. In the commentary to the Discussion Draft, the Commission
labeled the compromise as essentially a pro-disclosure device, but
one which also had an adverse impact on the moral standing of the
involved lawyer and the profession generally, and which therefore
embodied the worst of both worlds.144
But it should not be thought that the Kutak Commission re-
jected an implicit disclosure device merely to clear the decks for an
explicit and broad disclosure rule. The language of rule 3.1(a)(3) of
the Discussion Draft, although explicit, is itself very narrow in
scope, for it prohibits the offering of false evidence only when the
lawyer is "convinced beyond a reasonable doubt" that it is false.1' "
And this standard apparently applies even in civil cases.
The choice of this "beyond a reasonable doubt" language can-
not have been accidental, for one of the questions that always
arises when lawyers discuss client perjury is what it means to
"know" that the testimony is false. It seems likely that the Kutak
Commission implicitly adopted, on this point of what "counts" as
knowledge of perjury, the views expressed by Kenneth Pye in a
1978 article4 6 that the Kutak Commission cited as a resource for
this section of the Discussion Draft. Pye distinguished between
cases in which the client tells the lawyer both the truth and the
proposed perjured version, and cases in which the client tells a
doubtful story from the beginning, but adheres to it. In the latter
cases, the lawyer may harbor grave suspicions, but he does not
know beyond a reasonable doubt that the testimony will be
false,14 8 and rule 3.1(a)(3) directs that the attorney present the tes-
timony to the court. It is unclear whether there are other situa-
tions in which the lawyer may be viewed as having knowledge be-
yond a reasonable doubt, but presumably they are relatively few.
The Lawyer's Code has an excellent separate introductory sec-
tion on the question of knowledge1 49 derived from the chapter that
Professor Freedman devoted to the subject in his book.150 That
144. MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 1, rule 3.1, Comment.
145. Id. rule 3.1(a)(3).
146. Pye, The Role of Counsel in the Suppression of Truth, 1978 DUKE L.J. 921.
147. Id. Even here, the lawyer cannot be absolutely sure which of two unsworn state-
ments by the client is true, although in practice most lawyers are probably worldlywise
enough to "know" which story is true and which is false.
148. Id.
149. LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 18, at 8-10.
150. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 51, at 51.
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section rightly points out that imprecision on this point allows law-
yers to evade many ethical problems by simply defining them out
of existence: if one never "knows" that perjury is being presented,
there is never a dilemma.15 1 The commentary also properly criti-
cizes other sections of the Discussion Draft for its vagueness on
this most crucial definitional point, and it is therefore doubly sig-
nificant that the Discussion Draft has chosen this one area in
which to be perfectly clear.
Under the language of rule 3.1(a)(3) of the Discussion Draft,
lawyers can in the vast majority of cases legitimately argue that
they do not know beyond a reasonable doubt that the proposed
testimony is false, and in those cases they are bound to present the
case in normal fashion and with full zeal, just as they would under
the Lawyer's Code. Indeed, it may well be argued that the rule is
so narrow that it will never apply, and that it is therefore actually
a disguised nondisclosure rule. If that was the intention of the
drafters of the rule, then they may be guilty of the kind of evasion
against which Professor Freedman and the Lawyer's Code railed.
They may be guilty of the further sin of seeming to proclaim to the
public a duty which would not in reality exist under the scheme of
the Discussion Draft. The one thing they would not be guilty of is
drafting an "anti-client" provision.
If rule 3.1 is actually a nondisclosure rule, one may debate the
wisdom, and perhaps the morality, of displaying wares to the pub-
lic in a misleading fashion, but one can no longer claim that the
Discussion Draft and the Lawyer's Code differ significantly in their
practical impact. If lawyers interpret the extremely narrow reach
of the the disclosure provisions as a license to disobey the technical
command of the provision, that is further indication that the true
audience for all of the codes is in fact the public.152
151. On the impropriety of using this escape device, Professors Hazard and Freedman
are for once united. According to Hazard, lawyers frequently violate the rule against assist-
ing perjury, but "seek escapes from moral responsibility for having done so." G. HAZARD,
supra note 15, at 130. The evasion device discussed in the text is "pure casuistry." Id.
Professor Freedman states that "such reasoning is morally irresponsible .... [a] kind of
sophistry." M. FREEDMAN, supra note 51, at 52, 55.
152. Because Professor Hazard, Reporter to the Kutak Commission, shares Professor
Freedman's view concerning the impropriety of ducking the moral issue by abolishing
"knowledge," note 151 supra, it is unlikely that the Discussion Draft intended that rule 3.1
be an evasion device. The Discussion Draft probably adopted Professor Pye's dichotomy. In
addition, the drafters probably had in mind situations in which a lawyer, considering all the
circumstances, is driven to a conclusion, much as a jury is driven to its conclusion. At one
point, the commentary uses the phrase "it is plain to the lawyer that the testimony will be
perjurous." MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 1, rule 3.1, Comment at 15. Per-
[Vol. 35:739
THREE PEAS IN A POD
Even in the few cases where the lawyer knows the perjured
testimony is false in the sense described, the Discussion Draft con-
tains a third feature that provides an additional escape hatch. Sub-
section (f) of rule 3.1, which explicitly provides an exception in
criminal cases if "applicable law" so requires, further limits the
"Candor Toward Tribunal" requirements of rule 3.1."53 The com-
mentary to this rule makes it clear that the phrase "applicable
law" is intended to refer to case law, gradually developing in some
jurisdictions,"" which holds that the constitutional rights of a
criminal defendant to due process and effective counsel outweigh
the ethical duty of the lawyer to reveal even known perjury. In
those jurisdictions, "applicable law" controls, just as it did in all of
the cases of "obedience to law" discussed earlier in this article. 5
As in so many other areas, the Discussion Draft recognizes, in
the context of client perjury, that legal developments outside any
code of legal ethics shape what is proper for lawyers to do on be-
half of clients. It is proper to move to suppress "truth" in the form
of clearly relevant and trustworthy evidence that was obtained by
unconstitutional means, for example, because "the law" in certain
circumstances makes that evidence objectionable.1" It is proper to
undermine the credibility of a truthful witness15 7 by cross-exami-
haps this better captures the intention. In any event, the concern that Model Rule 3.1 might
become a nondisclosure rule is valid and the Commission or the ABA House of Delegates
should address it.
153. MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 1, rule 3.1(f).
154. See, e.g., cases cited at MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 2, rule 3.1,
Comment.
155. See notes 67-71 and accompanying text supra.
156. This reflects the "exclusionary rule," which prohibits the use in a criminal trial of
evidence that was seized in contravention of the defendant's constitutional rights. See Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) and its progeny.
157. This problem presents one of Professor Freedman's original "three hardest ques-
tions." Freedman, supra note 121. His position on this point, however, is now barely contro-
versial and represents the consensus view. In his book, Professor Freedman notes that his
antagonist on the other questions, Chief Justice Burger, agreed with him on this question as
early as 1966. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 51, at 43, 44-45.
Reversing its earlier view, the ABA, in its Standards for Criminal Justice, now states
that defense counsel is "not precluded" from cross-examining a witness he thinks is telling
the truth, but this belief "should, if possible, be taken into consideration" during the ques-
tioning. 1979 Standards, supra note 125, Standards 4-7.6(b).
The commentary to this Standard quotes with approval Justice White's opinion in
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). Justice White noted that when the defendant
does not testify and the State is put to its proof, frequently the only tactic that counsel will
have is to create doubt about the testimony of the state's witnesses. That, he concluded, is
part of the price we pay for our "modified adversary system," in which it is "honorable" for
defense lawyers to do things unrelated to the search for truth. Id. at 257-58 (1967) (White,
J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
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nation, even with stale convictions that do not involve veracity, be-
cause "the law" in many jurisdictions makes those convictions rele-
vant. 58 If the Supreme Court were ever to rule that the assistance
of counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment includes counsel
that will assist in presenting perjured testimony, 59 then without
further amendment, the Discussion Draft would properly authorize
such behavior. Similarly, if "the law" develops what is in effect a
personal privilege to engage in perjury 60 for those accused of and
guilty of crimes, then all ethical codes will be amended pro tanto in
that regard as well, and lawyers will present the testimony without
qualms.
There is actually a fourth escape route from the seemingly
mandatory disclosure provision of the Discussion Draft, although it
is really a preventive device. In common with the present Code and
the Lawyer's Code, the Discussion Draft contemplates that in vir-
tually all civil cases and many criminal cases, the lawyer will have
withdrawn from representation of the client before being faced
with the client perjury dilemma. Surprisingly, none of the codes
clearly imposes a duty to withdraw in the context of client per-
jury,' 6' and none contains an explicit cross-reference that would
allow easy confirmation of this point. Nonetheless, Professor Wolf-
158. The evidence rules of many states and Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
put severe restrictions on the use of prior convictions to impeach the credibility of a witness.
The restrictions generally concern the staleness of the convictions and limit admissible con-
victions to those involving falsehood or dishonesty. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 609.
In the jurisdictions where no such limitations exist, see, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 785,
788 (West 1966); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 622.2, .17 (1950), however, it is clear that defense
counsel may-actually must in most cases because of the duty to act with zeal on the
client's behalf-present the witnesses' convictions.
159. Professor Wolfram doubts that the Court will rule that way, citing a series of cases
in which the Court implicitly or explicitly rejected the view that a criminal defendant who
testifies is immune from having his testimony impeached. Wolfram, supra note 131, at 977
n.73. Typical is the statement in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) that even
constitutionally based exclusionary rules should not be "perverted into a license to use per-
jury by way of defense." I share Professor Wolfram's doubts.
160. In his contribution to this Symposium, Professor Freedman in effect argues for
such a privilege, because of his insistence on the autonomy of the individual. Freedman,
supra note 26. Professor Hazard also recognizes that even in civil cases, when the stakes are
high enough, the urge to self-preservation may be virtually irresistible: "to require a party to
choose between imprisonment or financial self-destruction on the one hand, and complete
truthfulness on the other, is to impose a moral burden that may simply be too heavy." G.
HAZARD, supra note 15, at 130.
The law, however, is contrary and is not likely to change in this respect. See note 159
supra.
161. See note 128 supra for a discussion of the present Code's treatment of the duty to
withdraw. Note 163 infra and accompanying text discuss the treatment by the Discussion
Draft and the Lawyer's Code of this issue.
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ram, in his recent article that focused specifically on the client per-
jury provisions of the Discussion Draft and Lawyer's Code, 6 ' not
only had little trouble tracking down the withdrawal provisions in
both codes, but concluded that this feature is "by far the most im-
portant point of agreement" in the two codes."'3
Most of the shouting, then, is over a small number of criminal
cases, in which the lawyer discovers the perjury after it is too late
to withdraw. Even in those instances, lawyers who operate under
the Discussion Draft must reveal the false testimony to the court
in a normal fashion, unless they know "beyond a reasonable
doubt" that the testimony is false, or unless the courts continue to
develop constitutional law theories which grant criminal defen-
dants a special privilege to lie. Also, because the Discussion Draft
appears to contemplate "beyond a reasonable doubt" disclosure
chiefly in cases in which the client has admitted the perjury to the
lawyer,"" the Miranda warnings feature of the Draft takes on an
added significance, and it is to that last item that I now turn.
162. Wolfram, supra note 131.
163. Id. at 969. Rule 1.16(a)(1) of the Discussion Draft requires withdrawal if "continu-
ing the representation will result in a course of conduct by the lawyer that is illegal or
inconsistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct," MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft),
supra note 1, rule 1.16(a)(1), and is thus reminiscent of the present Code's DR 2-110. See
note 128 supra. Professor Wolfram neatly demonstrates that the Model Rules imprecisely
state this duty because rule 3.1 requires the lawyer to report the perjury, and therefore no
improper conduct "will result." The intention is clear, however, and rule 3.1 needs only a
technical amendment.
The Lawyer's Code requires withdrawal, even in criminal cases, "to avoid commission
by the lawyer of a disciplinary violation," LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 18,
rule 6.6. Rule 3.7 makes it a disciplinary offense to knowingly present false testimony. Id.
rule 3.7. Rule 1.2, however, which prohibits direct or indirect divulgence of client confi-
dences, qualifies rules 6.6 and 3.7, and rule 1.2 explicitly makes the confidentiality obliga-
tion superior. In practice, this means that the lawyer can withdraw only in cases where he
discovers the perjury early enough so that the withdrawal will not imply that the lawyer
believes that he expects the client to lie. In those early discovery cases, however, withdrawal
is mandatory.
164. Limiting the disclosure rule to situations in which the client has admitted the per-
jury makes rule 3.1 of the Discussion Draft reminiscent of the discredited Standard 4-7.7. As
noted at the end of note 130 supra, that Standard was only triggered when the client admit-
ted the perjury and the lawyer's independent investigation established the truth of the con-
fession. The Standard was thus subject not only to the criticism that it counseled conduct
that inevitably disclosed the fact that the client was in the process of testifying falsely, but
also to the criticism that it applied in so few cases that it was in actuality an evasion device.
As discussed at note 151 supra, Model Rule 3.1 could be subjected to this latter criti-
cism if it were limited to cases involving admitted perjury only, but it is likely that the
Kutak Commission intended that it cover at least a few more than those cases.
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D. Miranda Warnings to your Own Client: Breeding Mistrust
or Educating the Public?
Rule 1.4(b) of the Discussion Draft, which discusses "adequate
communication" with the client, contains the Miranda feature of
the Draft. This rule requires lawyers to advise clients about "the
relevant legal and ethical limitations to which the lawyer is sub-
ject"1 5 when the lawyer becomes concerned that the client expects
prohibited assistance. In short, lawyers must tell clients about lim-
itations on the principle of confidentiality, rather than pretend
that the principle is absolute. As demonstrated earlier,"6 a client's
confidences are subject to far less than absolute protection, regard-
less of which code is in effect, especially because of the circular but
far-reaching exception that requires the lawyer to reveal what "the
law" requires to be revealed.167
By placing this provision early in the Discussion Draft, as part
of a long introductory section that discusses lawyer-client relations
generally, the Kutak Commission surely meant to highlight its cen-
trality to the relationship itself. Since the lawyer is the one best
able to ascribe significance to the outside "law," and because the
client may well be infected by the "hired gun" mythology, the
spirit of full disclosure-"truth in lawyering"-seems to demand
such a warning. Thus viewed, the warning may be the fullest
flowering of the trusting relationship, rather than its death knell.'
Admittedly, many clients who consult a lawyer hoping to ob-
tain prohibited assistance may be disappointed, but they will have
no right to feel betrayed by their lawyer or to feel that their lawyer
acted other than in a trustworthy and forthright manner. Clients
of this type have been betrayed not by their own lawyers, but by
the variance between their idea of what a lawyer should do and
reality. By disabusing them of their ideas at the earliest possible
stage, the lawyer has served them well, not poorly. Furthermore,
by giving the now forewarned client a chance to back out immedi-
ately, the lawyer has also displayed his trustworthiness in concrete
terms, for the most plausible alternative that the lawyer has thus
eschewed is that of accepting the client's money now but betraying
165. MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 1, rule 1.4(b).
166. See notes 47-65 and accompanying text supra.
167. See notes 67-71 and accompanying text supra.
168. For a discussion of this ironic but important possibility, see Burt, Conflict and
Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015 (1981) and notes 248-54 and accom-
panying text infra.
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him later if he persists in the perjury.169
In the client perjury context, this kind of candor carries an
obvious price. If the lawyer tells the client that admitted, but not
suspected, perjury will be revealed to the court, the client who is
inclined to perjury will have an incentive to get his perjured story
straight the first time. There is also the risk, unavoidable in any
model that puts any limitations on the lawyer's participation, that
the client will tell one lawyer a perjured story, get rebuffed, and
then go to another lawyer and reveal nothing. On the other hand, a
client who deceives his own lawyer and tries to go it alone with a
story that is easy to refute runs a tremendous risk that the scheme
will come undone suddenly and dramatically in court. The end re-
sult for the client will actually be worse than if he had told the
truth to his lawyer in the first place, and kept mum at trial.
The commentary to the Discussion Draft explicitly recognizes
both sides of this dilemma, and solves it by noting that in the end
the client is the one who, properly counseled, makes the critical
choice. The Miranda feature of the Discussion Draft and the com-
parable initial counseling contemplated by the Lawyer's Code
70
thus bring me full circle-a real function of these codes is to edu-
cate clients about what to expect from and how to use their law-
yers. Each client is counseled early on by the individual lawyer,
and all potential clients are eventually counseled as the legal pro-
fession demystifies itself via wide dissemination of information
about whatever code is finally adopted.
E. Conclusion: Drafting a Code for the Long Run
A significant audience at which the proposed codes are di-
rected is the public at large, potential clients of lawyers generally.
This is so because in areas of total agreement amongst lawyers,
differences in code language will be interpreted to encompass that
agreement, 1 7 and in areas of controversy, developments outside
the codes will largely control how the codes will be interpreted and
169. A Miranda warning of this kind should be equally necessary under the Lawyer's
Code, because that code also requires the lawyer to withdraw or not to accept the case if the
client reveals his intention to commit perjury early enough. LAWYER's CODE, supra note 18,
rule 1.16. See note 163 supra for a discussion of this Lawyer's Code provision. Obviously, a
lawyer could not escape this duty to withdraw by taking steps to remain ignorant of the
perjury.
170. See LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 7, rule 1.1, discussed further at
text accompanying note 179 infra.
171. See text following note 69 supra.
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how lawyers will act.172 As consensus is gradually reached, the
codes will be amended to conform to the consensus by the simi-
larly gradual process of common law interpretation.
The Lawyer's Code explicitly targets the general public as an
important audience in its Preamble, and the President of the
American Trial Lawyers Foundation in his introduction 173 referred
to the Lawyer's Code as a "Bill of Rights for Clients." It is no acci-
dent that both proposed codes discuss initial contacts with clients
in a prominent place at the very outset, the Lawyer's Code in rule
1.1, and the Discussion Draft in rule 1.4.
As we have seen,1 74 the Miranda feature of rule 1.4 of the Dis-
cussion Draft is a central part of the document because it tells cli-
ents forthrightly that the lawyer will use all of his skills and knowl-
edge for the client, but that there are certain rare cases in which
other policies will outweigh the client's right to use the lawyer to
further his own ends. This is a needed educational function, for
literature, films, and television have engendered a myth that the
lawyer-client privilege is unlimited, and that a lawyer will do, in
fact must do, anything and everything for a client.
Surely, for example, most criminals who bring in the murder
weapon or the sack of stolen money to their lawyers have some
vague idea that once those items are in the lawyer's hands, they
are forever immune from discovery. If a generation from now it is
widely understood that this is not true,7 5 fewer such turnovers will
occur, but that is a small price to pay for a generation of telling the
truth about the legal profession.
The final surprise, though by now it should be predictable, is
that the initial client interview provisions of the Lawyer's Code
also serve this educating and "warning-off" function, though more
obliquely. Rule 1.1 stresses that the lawyer must make every effort
to win the trust of the client and impress upon him the need for
total candor. Presumably as part of the entreaty to full disclosure,
the lawyer is directed to "explain to the client the lawyer's obliga-
172. See id.
173. LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 18, at ii.
174. See notes 166-69 and accompanying text supra.
175. In reality, the cases in this area are surprisingly uniform in holding that not only is
the active hiding of the fruits or instrumentalities of crime improper, In re Ryder, 263 F.
Supp. 360 (E.D. Va.), aff'd per curiam, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967), and the refusal to
honor a subpoena improper, In re January 1976 Grand Jury, 534 F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1976);
State v. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828, 394 P.2d 681 (1953), but affirmative action to turn the
items over to the authorities may be required. Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200 (Alaska 1978).
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tion of 'confidentiality."' 7  But what is that obligation? Surely a
lawyer cannot lie to the client and claim that the obligation is ab-
solute, because even the Lawyer's Code contains a number of ex-
ceptions to the confidentiality principle, some of which can turn
out to be uncomfortably broad in practice. Should the lawyer give
some examples of the exceptions, such as the hypotheticals consid-
ered in this article?
Should the lawyer acknowledge that if "the law" changes ma-
terially during the course of the representation, a redefinition of
the obligation might take place? Should the lawyer give advance
warning as to what he would do if the SEC actually promulgated,
rather than proposed, a rule requiring affirmative disclosures by
securities counsel?177 How specific should the lawyer get in warn-
ing about intra-corporate conflicts of interest that may develop in
the future and the impact those conflicts might have on the obliga-
tion of confidentiality? 178
The point is that much as the drafters of the Lawyer's Code
might prefer to have an absolute rule of confidentiality, they are
just as powerless as the drafters of the Discussion Draft to achieve
it. Regardless of what they promulgate in a code, the drafters must
admit and disclose that matters outside their work product exert
the mqre significant influence on lawyer conduct.
To be as fair to clients as the Lawyer's Code claims to be, the
key sentence in rule 1.1 must be extended to read: The lawyer
shall ekplain to the client the lawyer's obligation of confidentiality
and itk limitations. Once that is done, of course, there is no longer
any difference at all between the codes. Under each of them, the
lawyer must educate the client about ethical limits on lawyer ac-
tion, and the codes themselves serve to educate society as a whole.
This is not because the codes will be read by a significant number
of nonlawyers, but because lawyers will "teach" the codes to their
clients, and word will begin to get out.
- When the organized Bar turns its attention to the Kutak Com-
176. LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 18, rule 1.1.
177. See note 98 supra for a discussion of extra-code legal developments affecting se-
curities counsel, including the possibility that the SEC will at some later date return to
rulemaking. See ABA Opposes Securities Lawyers' Code, The National Law Journal, Dec.
7, 1981, at 5, col. 1 (ABA criticizes SEC's proposed establishment of a standard of ethical
conduct as ambiguous, conducive to creating confusion within the profession, and without
legal basis).
178. See text following note 104 supra for a discussion of the lawyer's warning obliga-
tion in the context of the intracorporate conflicts problem and representation of entity
clients.
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mission's next draft, or a revised Lawyer's Code, I do not suggest
that draftsmanship be ignored, or that tone is irrelevant, or that
expert commentary and finely tuned examples be jettisoned. What
I do suggest is that we concentrate more on explaining to the pub-
lic what the implications of our work product are.
In the areas in which lawyers agree, let the public be told in
concise language that admits of as little doubt as possible. Where
lawyers disagree or, more commonly, where the answer to a prob-
lem cannot be stated in absolute terms but depends on balancing a
variety of subtle factors, let the public be told of this uncertainty.
Clients are accustomed to consulting lawyers about complex legal
problems, and lawyers are accustomed to admitting that "the law"
is rarely clearcut. It is time to accept the fact that one of the com-
plex and unclear legal questions to which lawyers must give tenta-
tive answers is that of their own shifting responsibilities to their
clients.
The only alternative to this course of action is to supply
clients with services to which they are not entitled, or-perhaps
worse-to promise those forbidden services in order to keep the
cash flowing and then not deliver.
III. ADDENDUM: THE FINAL DRAFT-A FOURTH PEA FOR THE POD
AND A BRIEF LOOK FORWARD 0
rri.
The Kutak Commission issued its proposed Final Draf of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct on May 30, 1981. Twq .things
are striking about the Final Draft: First, it demonstrates that the
Commission was listening when its critics were assaulting the origi-
nal draft, for many subtle changes in the text are clearly designed
to mollify them; second, the overall substantive impact of the final
product is virtually indistinguishable from that of its predecessor.
The answer to the questions put in the introduction to this
article179 is thus that the Final Draft is not a substantive or sub-
stantial retreat from the Discussion Draft; it is a fourth pea for the
pod. The changes are indeed largely cosmetic, but I do not use that
term with any pejorative intent. To the contrary, the Commission
has properly "cleaned up" 180 some of the language that was ill-ad-
vised or widely misunderstood, and has thus allowed us to debate
179. See text following note 6 supra.
180. Professor Freedman, a most persistent critic of the Discussion Draft, was quoted
by the American Bar Association Journal as conceding that the Final Draft is "a lot
cleaner." Winter, supra note 4, at 688.
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the real merits of the proposal, instead of a straw man.
Since the Final Draft is the one that will be debated line by
line, and since I have never claimed that code language is irrele-
vant-only that it is not dispositive-I also use the opportunity
provided by this Addendum to take a first look forward at what
life under the Model Rules would be like. What guidance do they
give to lawyers thinking through tough ethical problems? What
threats do they make? And perhaps most importantly, since the
Miranda feature is retained,181 how do they help lawyers explain to
clients the truth about law and lawyering?
A. Mandatory Disclosure of Client Secrets: Textually
Out-But Practically In
The Commission's revised treatment of the Discussion Draft's
most controversial and most misunderstood mandatory duty to re-
veal client secrets in exigent circumstances quintessentially cap-
tures the Commission's approach. The Final Draft represents a
compromise in language without compromise of principle, but it
also makes subtle changes that are nontrivial.
Textually, the Final Draft contains no provisions calling for
mandatory disclosure of client secrets, and this feature alone will
doubtless convert many erstwhile critics to at least grudging sup-
porters. But the commentary to the basic rule on confidentiality
(now renumbered 1.6 from 1.7) makes it explicit that the effect of
other rules, both in and out of the Model Rules, will be to compel
disclosures-convert "may" to "shall"-mostly because of the re-
tained "required by law" provision 82 discussed at length in the
main body of this article.8 '
Rule 1.6(a) first actually simplifies and broadens the basic rule
of confidentiality, for it applies to all information "relating to"
18 4
representation of a client, and there are no preliminary determina-
tions to be made about whether the information would be "embar-
rassing" or "detrimental" to the client, as was the case under both
181. MODEL RULES (Final Draft), supra note 2, rule 1.2(e).
182. The "required by law" provision appears in the Final Draft at rule 1.6(b)(5), and
permits discretionary disclosures to the extent necessary "to comply with the Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct or other law." MODEL RULES (Final Draft), supra note 2, rule 1.6(b)(5).
The significance of this reformulation is discussed at notes 201-08 and accompanying text
infra.
183. See notes 66-71 and accompanying text supra.
184. MODEL RULES (Final Draft), supra note 2, rule 1.6(a).
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the Code and the Discussion Draft.18 5 Nor, as was previously the
case, need the client request that the information be held inviolate
in order for confidentiality to attach. s'8 Instead, a specific informed
consent by the client is required to disestablish confidentiality.87
These changes are not mere window dressing, for the basic analytic
structure of the confidentiality rule has clearly been strengthened:
the principle is a universal one with limited itemized exceptions.
Previous codes and drafts, on the other hand, had an initial
threshold for application of the principle and then engrafted ex-
ceptions, some of which turned out to be quite broad in practice.
Under the Final Draft, we may debate the wisdom or the clarity of
the exceptions, but that is all we have to debate.
Rule 1.6(b) lists five exceptions to the basic rule of confidenti-
ality, all of which are discretionary and may be invoked only to the
extent the lawyer believes necessary to accomplish the purpose of
the exception involved."" This is also an analytic improvement
over earlier versions, for the qualifier "to the extent necessary" did
not unequivocally apply to all the exceptions in either the Code or
the Discussion Draft. 89 Tailoring the exception to the precise
needs of the situations is, of course, fully consistent with the over-
all approach of the Kutak Commission: lawyerlike balancing, case
by case.
The Discussion Draft imposed a mandatory disclosure rule in
only two circumstances: when future acts might involve death or
serious bodily injury, and when "required by law."' 90 These excep-
tions now appear in separate subsections, 1.6(b)(2) and (b)(5), re-
spectively, and are both discretionary. In addition, the first of
these subsections also permits disclosure of future "substantial"
185. See ABA CODE, supra note 12, DR 4-101(A); MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft),
supra note 1, rule 1.7(a).
186. See ABA CODE, supra note 12, DR 4-101(A); Discussion Draft, supra note 1, rule
1.7(a), 1.7(c)(1).
187. MODEL RULES (Final Draft), supra note 2, rule 1.6(a).
188. Id. rule 1.6(b).
189. DR 4-101(C)(4) allows revelation of confidences or secrets "necessary" to help a
lawyer collect a fee or defend against a charge of wrongdoing, and should surely be read as if
it included the words "to the extent necessary." Some subsections of DR 4-101(C), however,
contain no language of necessity at all, although the overall content of the rule cries out for
such a reading. Rule 1.7 of the Discussion Draft also clearly contemplated such a limited
reading, but some of the subsections did not contain actual language to that effect.
The draftsmanship of the Final Draft is superior, because the placement of the limiting
language before the list of exceptions makes it explicit that each exception is so limited.
MODEL RULES (Final Draft), supra note 2, rule 1.6(b).
190. MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 1, rule 1.7(b).
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frauds. 9
Assessing the effect of these provisions is complicated, for they
must be compared to both the Code and to the Discussion Draft,
and one must take into account arguments not only that the new
provisions still permit or require disclosure of too much, but also
that they may have swung the pendulum too far the other way,
and now permit. disclosure of too little.
The fact that disclosure is no longer mandatory in the most
serious cases-rare situations involving advance warning of murder
or mayhem-should have no practical impact at all. As discussed
early on in the main body of the article, 92 these cases are easy no
matter what the precise code language happens to be, because the
moral imperative irresistably transforms "may reveal" into "must
reveal," and even Professor Freedman does not disagree.1 3
Serious cases of a lower order-the Final Draft classifies them
as frauds involving "substantial injury to the financial interest or
property of another" 194 -will present genuine cases of discretion-
ary disclosure and will involve genuine moral dilemmas. In these
cases, unlike the cases involving death, lawyers may differ on the
proper moral judgment; indeed, it is the very possibility of choice
that that gives these scenarios their bite. The lawyer has three op-
tions: go along with the fraud, withdraw from the case but remain
silent, or withdraw and reveal the fraud in time to prevent it.
The first option is of course an unethical choice, and is clearly
prohibited by every code discussed in this article, including the
Lawyer's Code. 96 A lawyer who chooses that route may be liable as
joint tortfeasor or criminal co-defendant with the client, may be
subject to professional discipline, and in no event will be heard to
claim that his conduct was proper because directed by the client.
Lawyers taking that route are not really affected by a code; they
ignore it as they ignore all law.
Lawyers for whom a code has any independent meaning, then,
must choose between the two remaining alternatives, and the
choice is indeed difficult. Assuming that the lawyer has knowledge
only, and has not participated in any way in preparing the fraud,
or facilitating it, 96 there are legitimate policy and moral argu-
191. MODEL RULES (Final Draft), supra note 2, rule 1.6(b)(2).
192. See text accompanying notes 49-65 supra.
193. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 51, at 6. See text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
194. MODEL RULES (Final Draft), supra note 2, rule 1.6(b)(2).
195. LAWYER'S CODE, supra note 18, rule 3.6.
196. Rule 3.6 of the Lawyer's Code uses the phrase "participate in creating" to describe
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ments to be made on both sides.
It can be argued that the societal value in preventing frauds is
high, and that people who are daily involved with the law are the
most appropriate ones to take action voluntarily. In this view, law-
yers have more of a duty than the average citizen to take affirma-
tive action, and should not merely bemoan the sorry state of a
world that has fraud in it. But it can also be argued that the socie-
tal value of the confidentiality principle over the long run out-
weighs the harm to the victim of any one fraud. The reasoning is
not merely that society has an interest in having people consult
lawyers about legal problems and that such consultations will be
curtailed if inroads are made on the privilege; the further argu-
ment is that over the long run increased consultations will de-
crease the total number of frauds, because often clients genuinely
in doubt about a course of conduct will be dissuaded from fraud by
their lawyers. Under this view, lawyers have less of a duty to pre-
vent a particular fraud than do people generally; instead they have
a duty not to prevent it, if the fraud is to be perpetrated by their
clients.
The Final Draft leaves the calculus of a particular case to the
involved lawyer, merely suggesting in the commentary some of the
factors that may usefully be weighed, such as the seriousness of the
fraud and the likelihood that it will actually take place.' e7 No pre-
tense is made that the balance is an easy one, or that a linguistic
formula can make the difficulty disappear; taking responsibility for
decisionmaking is seldom comfortable.
As noted earlier, the sliding scale approach of the Final Draft
is hard to assess, for it combines a number of features that pull
toward opposite ends of the secrecy-disclosure spectrum. The basic
rule against disclosure applies to more information, and there is no
the conduct it bars; for a lawyer, this would surely encompass both direct aid and various
forms of "facilitation." The Final Draft in numerous places distinguishes between mere law-
yer knowledge and lawyer participation, but takes a broad view of what "counts" as partici-
pation. The commentary to rule 1.2, for example, notes that even when the lawyer assists a
client under the mistaken belief that a transaction is nonfraudulent, mere withdrawal may
not be enough, for the "involvement" of the lawyer, though innocent, may constitute assis-
tance or facilitation. The commentary to rule 1.6 returns to this hypoihetical, and reiterates
that even though the initial lawyer action was itself not improper, "the lawyer's professional
services were made the instrument of the client's crime or fraud."
197. The likelihood that the client may not actually carry out his scheme is a subtle
factor to assess, since it may itself largely depend upon whether the client thinks the lawyer
will take interdicting action. A lawyer may thus actually be able to prevent some client
frauds merely by surfacing the possibility that the lawyer will act, or by stating affirmatively
that he will.
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longer any situation (in the language of the rule itself) that calls
for mandatory disclosure; yet at the same time disclosure is per-
mitted in certain cases not involving bodily injury, and there are
cases in which disclosure becomes mandatory because of the opera-
tion of other rules. Overall, how does the Final Draft's broad-rang-
ing license to decide compare with what went before?
Compared to the Code, the Final Draft does not represent a
widening of lawyer discretion, for the Code's "future crimes" ex-
ception to the confidentiality principle almost certainly applies to
frauds.198 Indeed, it is hard to think of a substantial fraud that is
not a crime. Compared to rule 1.7(c)(2) of the Discussion Draft,
the Final Draft permits no broader disclosure, for that rule, prob-
ably because of poor draftsmanship, had permitted disclosures
necessary to prevent a "deliberately wrongful act" by the client,
arguably including most intentional torts and perhaps even antici-
patory breaches of contract.199
Actually, the Final Draft narrows the lawyer's permitted range
of disclosure in a large number of cases. The Code permits disclo-
sure of any contemplated crimes, whereas the Final Draft limits
even permitted disclosures to life-threatening crimes and substan-
tial fraud crimes. The Final Draft and its commentary and re-
search notes are crystal clear that a lawyer may not reveal the in-
tention of his client to commit, say, bicycle theft, bigamy,
moonshining, or desertion from the Armed Forces.200 In all but the
two most serious cases, the Final Draft has weighted the balance
for lawyers, ruling in advance that the future rewards to the sys-
tem of maintaining confidentiality outweigh any present harm.
Some may argue that the Final Draft has thus actually gone
too far in the opposite direction, and has insulated too many nasty
plans behind the wall of secrecy. In the corporate field particularly,
198. See ABA CODE, supra note 12, DR 4-101(C)(3).
199. MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 1, rule 1.7(c)(2). Dean Norman
Redlich subjected this aspect of the Discussion Draft to particularly cogent criticism in a
recent aticle. Redlich, Disclosure Provisions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
1980 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 981, 985-86. He was especially distressed by the Dis-
cussion Draft's broad definition of "deliberately wrongful act," which appeared to include
everything involving an element of scienter barring only pure negligence. Dean Redlich ar-
gued that even such innocuous conduct as failing to pay a debt might fall within this defini-
tion, allowing a lawyer to reveal the "wrongful act" to another.
Certainly, if that were the intendment of the Discussion Draft, it was far too broad.
Many other statements in the Draft's commentary, however, convinced me that a much
narrower rule was intended, and that the problem was one of draftsmanship. In any event,
the provision is wholly absent from the Final Draft.
200. MODEL RULES (Final Draft), supra note 2, rule 1.6, Comment, Notes.
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critics may accuse the Final Draft of helping cover-up frauds and
misrepresentations, and perhaps even major violations of the se-
curities laws, so long as no identifiable individual is threatened
with "substantial" financial injury. It is true, of course, that rule
1.6(b)(2) prohibits disclosure of the fraud in such cases, but it is
precisely in such cases that subsection (b)(5)-the "required by
law" exception-may step into the breach.
The potential reach of the Final Draft's formulation of this
fifth exception to the basic rule of confidentiality, "A lawyer may
reveal such information to the extent the lawyer believes necessary
... to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct or other
law, ' 201 is obviously very broad. The exception is not limited to
future plans or to serious crimes and frauds; it is, in fact, as broad
as the lawmaking organs of government choose to make it. Fur-
thermore, since "law" is constantly changing, the exception is also
almost limitlessly expandable. But the point to remember is that
this catch-all exception to the principle of confidentiality is present
in all three of the codes considered in the main body of the article,
including the supposedly absolutist Lawyer's Code.2 2 Just as is the
case now, lawyer conduct under the Final Draft de facto will be
most significantly influenced by law being developed outside of
lawyer codes.
If society, through the combined action of its courts, legisla-
tures, and agencies, chooses to single out a certain area, and there
impose affirmative reporting requirements that it does not impose
in other areas,203 then lawyers will in practice be forced to go along.
If the Final Draft "permits" a lawyer to volunteer a client's secret,
but well-established tort, criminal, or regulatory law will punish
the lawyer who does not, the exercise of the discretion supposedly
given is hardly an unfettered one.
Although the broad implications of the "comply with law" ex-
ception should be self-evident, the commentary to rule 1.6 is com-
mendably frank in reminding us that within the Model Rules
themselves there are some direct prohibitions and some affirmative
commands, so that in situations implicating them disclosure is
mandatory, despite the absence of that red-flagged word in the
text.20 4
201. Id. rule 1.6(b)(5).
202. See notes 66-69 and accompanying and following text supra.
203. The two areas that come most readily to mind are tax and securities regulation.
See the sampling of securities material discussed in note 98 supra.
204. The commentary isolates rules 1.2(d)(ban on assisting client's fraudulent conduct),
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Under rule 1.2(d), for example, a lawyer may not "counsel or
assist" a client in committing any "criminal or fraudulent" acts,
even if those acts are not the kind of serious violations that may
invoke a lawyer's moral duty to disclose them upon mere knowl-
edge. Commentary to that rule notes that if a lawyer has begun
representation in the mistaken belief that no illegality is involved,
but subsequently learns the truth, he will not only have to with-
draw immediately, but he may also have to take affirmative steps
to disassociate himself from the impending harm to avoid criminal
or tort liability. 0 5 The commentary to rule 1.6 therefore reminds
us that although rule 1.6(b) itself makes affirmative disclosures
only permissive, some disclosures may become mandatory in order
to comply with rule 1.2(d).20
Similarly, since rule 3.3(a)(4), which is discussed below, 207 con-
tinues the absolute ban on presenting perjured testimony and false
evidence, and requires that the lawyer take remedial action if he
learns of the falseness later (as in the case of surprise perjury), the
combined effect of this rule and rule 1.6(b)(5) is to require that
confidences be breached, even though the latter rule is phrased in
permissive terms.
Overall, the Commission has surely spent its time well in re-
drafting its final views on the general principles of confidentiality.
If the word "mandatory" was such a red flag that it precluded ra-
tional discussion, take it out-so long as it is clear that in the most
exigent situations the duty is in fact still mandatory. If the inter-
mediate cases are too hard to judge in advance, say so, and let law-
yers work out the proper solution on a case by case basis-so long
as it is clear that the line is always drawn at participation by the
lawyer. If the less serious cases should be automatically screened
from disclosure, say that also-so long as the "required by law" or
"comply with law" exception continues to remind us that many
positive commands of law are beyond our direct control.2 0 8
3.3(a)(4)(ban on use of false evidence), and 4.1 (requirement of truthfulness in lawyer's own
representations) as the rules that will sometimes transform "may reveal" into "must reveal."
The first two situations are discussed immediately following the text accompanying this
footnote.
205. MODEL RULES (Final Draft), supra note 2, rule 1.2, Comment at 13.
206. Id. rule 1.6, Comment at 39.
207. See notes 225-30 and accompanying text infra.
208. Although I have noted many times that a code for lawyers will often be "trumped"
by extra-code legal requirements, it should not be forgotten that lawyers as citizens, and
even more so as lobbyists, exert some control over the development of that outside law.
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B. Representing the Entity Client-Narrow Disclosure Rules
Clarified and Made More Narrow Still
The basic approach of the entity representation rule in the Fi-
nal Draft, which is still numbered 1.13, is the same as it was in the
Discussion Draft. The entity is the one and only client; when activ-
ity and conflict within the entity threaten harm to the entity, the
lawyer must discern the entity's best interests and act to further
them; in rare cases, such as when the highest authority in the en-
tity is part of the problem, not the solution, the lawyer may have
to go outside the entity altogether. As to tone, the rule continues
to be liberally peppered with words counseling moderation, and to
prescribe a step-by-step reasoned balancing of impending harm
against the harm of either lawyer action or lawyer inaction.
Two matters deserve special comment despite the overall simi-
larity of the Final Draft to its predecessor: a sharper analysis of
what is really at stake for the lawyer in intra-entity conflicts situa-
tions, and two new thresholds to lawyer action that reflect that
analysis, but also result in an even narrower disclosure rule.
One of the best statements of the Final Draft's position on the
intra-entity conflict situation is not contained in a rule or its com-
mentary, but in Chairman Kutak's special introduction.2 0 9 The
Commission rejected the view, he notes, that the problem is simply
a variant of the general conflict of interest problem that arises
when two or more clients vie for the loyalty of the lawyer. This is
so because there is only one client-the entity-and therefore the
problem really is that nonclients (officers, employees, perhaps even
the entire board of directors) may be hurting the client by their
actions. In this view, even the extreme step of going totally outside
the corporation should not be seen as "whistle-blowing" on the en-
tity, but rather a desperate cry for help for the entity.2 10
This view is consistent with the discussion in the main body of
this article,211 for I proposed that in certain situations the lawyer
might have a duty to disobey the previously expressed wishes of
the board of directors, and that it simply begged the question to
call the entity the client, but then allow the board always to speak
for the entity, even when the board's own decisions were at issue.
The lengthy research notes2 12 to rule 1.13, however, provide an
209. See MODEL RULES (Final Draft), supra note 2, at i.
210. Id. at ii.
211. See notes 106-12 and accompanying text supra.
212.. In addition to rules and commentary, the official version of the Final Draft con-
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even sounder basis for this result. They show that agency law rec-
ognizes an important distinction between co-agents and subagents,
and that even if the principal (the entity) has directed its agents to
hire another agent (the lawyer), the latter is an agent of the princi-
pal only, and owes no duty to the agent who hired him.'13 Further-
more, once it is agreed that the lawyer is the lawyer of the corpora-
tion, and others in the corporate family are mere co-agents and not
clients, then there is another familiar reason for insisting that in
the end the lawyer must make the final decision: what today's Ca-
non 5 would call the duty to exercise independent professional
judgment." 4 Clearly, it is appropriate for the lawyer to consult
with others whose high position in the entity shows that the entity
values their judgment. But just as clearly, the ultimate legal judg-
ments must be made by the lawyer alone, on behalf of the client.
The very "cleanness" of this analysis and Mr. Kutak's one
paragraph summary of it leads to my only criticism of the basic
scheme of rule 1.13: at least some of this analysis should be moved
to the commentary, where only the barest traces can now be found.
If the Final Draft is adopted, its format for mass distribution and
use will probably be sans special introduction and sans research
notes, and it would be a shame to lose these important and explicit
insights.
The commentary does make an important follow-up point that
is a frank reminder that the drafters of the Model Rules were not
only powerless to change extra-code law, but also included a few
generally applicable affirmative duties of their own."'1 Thus, al-
though it is true that in the specific situations covered by rule 1.13
the lawyer may be going outside the entity on its behalf to protect
it from false friends within, the commentary reminds us that other
rules may permit or require disclosures against the interests of an
entity client, just as in the case of an individual. The permissive
tains extensive "Research Notes" for each rule. These notes compare the new provisions to
the relevant Code provisions, and also discuss relevant case law, ethics opinions, and critical
literature.
The Research Notes do not merely provide invaluable assistance in understanding the
Final Draft; their mere existence makes the important point that writing and applying a
code for lawyer conduct cannot be divorced from "law" generally, and indeed that the new
Code is itself an important legal development.
213. MODEL RULES (Final Draft), supra note 2, at 87-88 (citing, among other sources,
W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 7 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 5, app. 25-38 (1957)).
214. ABA CODE, supra note 12, Canon 5. Under the Code, all of the rules regarding
conflict of interest are ultimately traceable back to this single "axiomatic norm."
215. MODEL RULES (Final Draft), supra note 2, at 84.'
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disclosure rules of rule 1.6, for example, still apply, and that means
that in effect certain disclosures may be mandatory, as discussed
earlier..2 " Direct lawyer involvement in entity crime or fraud is still
prohibited, and still calls for lawyer withdrawal, and probably for
rectifying action as well. 117
In the situations that do directly implicate rule 1.13, it ap-
pears that what might be called "friendly disclosures" will be even
more rare than under the Discussion Draft, because of two subtle
thresholds newly built into the rule.
The first of these is an overall trigger for operation of the rule;
it describes the situations in which the lawyer should start consid-
ering a measured climb up the entity's ladder of decisionmaking
responsibility. Other than cases of violation of internal entity rules
(for which disclosure to higher-up co-agents seems the obvious an-
swer and not controversial), rule 1.13 allows such disclosures only
when the lawyer "knows"218 that the actor's "violation of law" is
one that "reasonably might be imputed to the organization," and
in addition the injury to the organization is "likely" to be "mate-
rial. 21' 9 The phrase "violation of law" is the same as in the Discus-
sion Draft and is clearly meant to cover more than criminal con-
duct, but the second phrase is new. It makes more explicit the
notion that entity harm is what is at stake, but it also requires the
lawyer to pause for an extra beat to consider the possibility that
the misconduct will be found to be ultra vires or otherwise not im-
putable to the entity. If the "violation of law" is not imputable to
the entity, or is not likely to cause material injury even if it is im-
putable, the lawyer is directed not to get involved in the intra-
entity infighting. 2 0
Perhaps more significantly, and definitely more soothingly, the
Final Draft has also added a threshold at the opposite end of the
spectrum when the lawyer is considering the most extreme mea-
sure of going over the head of even the highest decision-making
body. The Final Draft allows lawyers to make disclosures outside
the entity only if revealing the information is in the best interests
of the organization (which is redundant, since rule 1.13 is other-
216. See notes 204-08 and accompanying text supra.
217. See note 196 supra for a discussion of the Final Draft's broad view of "participa-
tion" and "involvement," and the consequent necessity to take rectifying action.
218. For a discussion of the Final Draft's treatment of the important question of levels
of lawyer knowledge and belief, see notes 235-47 and accompanying text infra.
219. MODEL RULES (Final Draft), supra note 2, rule 1.13(b).
220. Id.
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wise inoperable anyway), and if, in addition, the lawyer is con-
vinced that the board of directors or other "highest authority" is
acting for private gain.2
21
This means that in a case in which the board of directors is on
record in favor of, say, open violation of a government regulation,
and it is clear that the board genuinely believes this action to be in
the best interests of the corporation,2 22 the lawyer is powerless to
do. anything but resign, even if subsequent discovery of the viola-
tion would badly hurt the organization. Furthermore, in the exam-
ple given the lawyer would also be powerless to reveal the organi-
zation's secrets under rule 1.6, since by hypothesis there is no
question of life-threatening crime or substantial fraud. And only in
the unlikely event that the regulation imposed an affirmative duty
on the lawyer to report violations (and such a regulation were
found to be valid by the courts) would the disclosure requirements
of rule 1.6(b)(5) be applicable.
Narrowing an already narrow rule in this fashion will no doubt
help the corporate bar come to terms with the Final Draft, for cor-
porate lawyers will usually be able to convince themselves to defer
to the board and thus relieve themselves of the responsibility for
making some tough choices. An argument can be made, though,
that in this one instance the Commission has retreated unnecessar-
ily far from its previous position, which, as I demonstrated in the
main body of this article,2 was hardly radical.
If the Commission's analysis is that the corporation is the cli-
ent, and that even the board of directors is only a group of co-
agents, then it would seem that the lawyer should not allow a
group of nonlawyers to interfere with-veto-his giving of legal
advice to the client. Although cases in which the board is betraying
the entity for venal reasons may more easily support a lawyer's
decision to go outside the organization, they should not be the only
possible ones if legal harm to the client is the test.
On the other hand, the Commission's position can be de-
221. Id. rule 1.13(c).
222. In a recent article commenting on the Commission's final product, Mr. Kutak drew
a powerful analogy to the "business judgment" rule in corporation law, and noted that the
effect of revised rule 1.13 would be to insulate decisions of this kind from further scrutiny
by counsel. Kutak, Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Ethical Standards for the '80s
and Beyond, 67 A.B.A. J. 1116, 1118 (1981).
The possibility that it may be "right" to violate certain regulations is discussed at note
107 supra. Compare this with Professor Hazard's notion of "running ethical risks," dis-
cussed at note 93 supra.
223. See text accompanying notes 112-14 supra.
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fended, even within its own analysis. It can be argued that ulti-
mately the fiction of an entity "consulting" a lawyer and accepting
or rejecting his advice must break down, and that the board's ac-
tion can be interpreted as a case of a well-counseled client making
an informed decision to reject the lawyer's advice. Once we assume
a well-intentioned "highest authority," we can with more equanim-
ity accept the notion of that body acting on behalf of the organiza-
tion for the specific purpose of evaluating the lawyer's advice. In-
deed, the Commission could argue, a contrary rule might make the
lawyer the sole arbiter of the validity of his own advice, or might
require the entity to hire a second lawyer to evaluate the advice of
the first.224
In any event, the overall structure of the rule is still sound,
and its analytic underpinnings have been explained with more
clarity. The rule contains many qualifiers ("give due considera-
tion," and "minimize disruption" are retained from the Discussion
Draft, along with a number of "reasonably believes," and "if war-
ranteds") that should make clear its limited and discretionary
scope.
C. Client Perjury, Lawyer Knowledge, Lawyer Belief, and
Some Related Matters
The Final Draft, in rule 3.3, continues the Discussion Draft's
ban on presentation of false evidence or perjured testimony and
continues to require affirmative remedial action on the part of the
lawyer, even at the expense of client confidences.2" There is a sig-
nificant textual change, however, which reflects the Commission's
acceptance of what was probably Professor Freedman's most co-
gent criticism of the whole scheme of the Discussion Draft, and the
client perjury provisions in particular. Ironically, the Commission's
adoption of Professor Freedman's draftsmanship (though not his
substantive views) has resulted in a rule calling for disclosure of
224. In Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 886 (W.D.N.C. 1977), a
civil action against the government and some of its employees, the court held that under DR
5-105(C), each co-defendant must consent to waive any potential conflict of interest in-
volved in sharing a lawyer, and that the involved lawyer was himself incapable of properly
counseling the defendants about his own possible inadequacy.
If this court's theory were applied generally to intra-entity conflict situations, especially
when the soundness of the lawyer's advice was at stake, hiring a second lawyer to evaluate
the advice of the first would be a frequent necessity. The Fourth Circuit reversed this case,
however, 570 F.2d 1197 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978), after finding "no
authority or reason to support the theory . . . ." 570 F.2d at 1201.
225. See MODEL RULES (Final Draft), supra note 2, rule 3.3(a)(4), (b).
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client confidences in more situations than under the Discussion
Draft, not fewer.
The Discussion Draft, it should be recalled, set the trigger for
disclosure at "convinced beyond a reasonable doubt," a standard
that would rarely be met in practice.2 2 Indeed, it was Professor
Freedman's point that this standard was so unrealistically narrow
that it bordered on the disingenuous: What profited the Commis-
sion to mandate disclosure if lawyers could use the Commission's
own language to convince themselves that the occasion for disclo-
sure would never arrive? Furthermore, a special Introduction to
the Lawyer's Code (adapted from Professor Freedman's book)23 7
properly criticized the whole scheme of the Discussion Draft for
paying insufficient attention to defining the all-important concepts
of "knowledge" or "knowing."'' 22 According to that Introduction,
the Discussion Draft used as many as nine different standards of
knowledge at various points, in seemingly haphazard fashion.
The Commission responded to these sound criticisms in two
ways in the Final Draft. First, there is now a glossary of terms
which includes definitions for "believes," "knows," "reasonably be-
lieves," and "reasonably should know."'2 9 Second, the client per-
jury or false evidence trigger in rule 3.3 is now simply that the
lawyer may not "knowingly" offer evidence that the lawyer
"knows" is false, and if false evidence is unwittingly presented, the
lawyer must take corrective action when he "comes to know of its
falsity. '23 0 The definition of the key terms in the rule is a simple
one: actual knowledge, which may be inferred (proved) from the
circumstances."' As before, the rule of mandatory disclosure is
subject to a possible constitutional caveat in criminal cases, if the
law should develop that way.'8 '
The resulting rule is analytically clear, and can be applied in
the real world. There is still, of course, the epistemological ques-
tion of what we mean by "actual knowledge," and the related prob-
lem of proof, but those are matters that the law contends with
daily in many areas of both civil and criminal law, whenever the
226. See text accompanying notes 148-51 supra.
227. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 51.
228. LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 18, at 8-9 (Introductory Comment
on "Knowing"); see text accompanying notes 149-52 supra.
229. See MODEL RULES (Final Draft), supra note 2, at 5.
230. Id. rule 3.3(a)(4).
231. Id. at 5.
232. See text accompanying notes 152-60 supra.
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state of mind of the actor is relevant. 2 83
Lawyers are men and women of the world and are at least as
able as people generally to make up their minds about what is and
is not true. Under the Final Draft, a lawyer may still defend
against a charge of presenting false evidence on the basis of lack of
knowledge, but often the defense will be unconvincing. If it re-
quired something close to what Professor Freedman in a related
context called "brute rationalization' 28' to conclude that the client
was not lying, then guilty knowledge (and subsequent evasion or
suppression of that knowledge) may properly be inferred. In a liti-
gated disciplinary proceeding, "knew" may in practice be the
equivalent of "must have known."
But although the trigger for disclosure adopted in the Final
Draft is thus certainly broader than the unrealistically narrow "be-
yond a reasonable doubt" standard of the Discussion Draft, it is
important to note that the Commission stopped short of imposing
the even broader standard of "reasonably should know." The Com-
mission did not impose a duty upon lawyers to aggressively ascer-
tain"2 the truth of the matter by cross-examination and investiga-
tion of their own clients.
But why? Does stopping short of requiring a lawyer to find out
about the evidence he is offering to a court represent the proper
balance of competing interests? Why does the Commission use
"know" as the trigger in one rule, and "reasonably should know" in
another? What is the Commission's general theory about the criti-
233. When first confronted with the language of rule 3.3 in class, one of my students
remarked that whenever a code purports to make the level of the lawyer's knowledge rele-
vant, it instead makes relevant what the trier of fact finds was the level of knowledge.
Because this student was clerking for the Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme
Court of Indiana at the time, I take it that he is a budding legal realist, not a cynic. Indeed,
although Mark DeYoung did not assist me in writing this article in the traditional role of
research assistant, I am indebted to him for shaping my thinking about this section of the
article.
234. One of Professor Freedman's "Three Hardest Questions," from his famous article,
see Freedman, supra note 121, involved the "Anatomy of a Murder" problem of giving the
client legal information that might help the client create perjured testimony.
In chapter six of his book, M. FREEDMAN, supra note 51, entitled "Refreshing Recollec.
tion on Prompting Perjury," Professor Freedman retreated a little from his original position,
and stated that while he still believed the lawyer should be reluctant to impute ill motives
to his client, "there does come a point, however, where nothing less than 'brute rationaliza-
tion' can purport to justify a conclusion that the lawyer is seeking in good faith to elicit
truth rather than actively participating in the creation of perjury." Id.at 75.
235. "Reasonably should know," according to the Final Draft, "denotes that a lawyer of
reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question." MODEL
RULES (Final Draft), supra note 2, at 5.
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cal question of lawyer knowledge?
In answer to these questions, it is instructive to take a quick
march through some of the key rules, to see what level of knowl-
edge calls forth ethical duties in the related contexts of accepting
and rejecting clients, counseling and assisting clients, disclosure of
client secrets, withdrawal from representation, and the making of
representations by the lawyer in the service of the client's cause.
This quick survey appears to me to show that the Commission is
still not one hundred precent sure of its ground on the question of
lawyer knowledge, and that both the rules and the commentary
still need a little work. Although the practical difference between
"knows" and "reasonably should know" may be relatively small,
largely because of problems of proof,2"6 the Commission may have
missed a good opportunity to perform its didactic mission in an
area where it is most needed.
The question of lawyer knowledge makes its earliest appear-
ance in the Final Draft quite early indeed, in rules 1.2(d) and (e).
These two may be called the "Anatomy of a Murder" rule and the
Miranda rule, and both are central to the very establishment of the
lawyer-client relationship.
Rule 1.2(d) prohibits the lawyer from counseling or assisting
the client in conduct which the lawyer "knows or reasonably
should know" is criminal or fraudulent. 3 7 It speaks to the "Anat-
omy of a Murder" scenario in which the lawyer-wittingly or un-
wittingly-puts into the client's hands information that will help
in the fabrication of testimony or the commission of crime or
fraud. As Professor Freedman demonstrated so brilliantly in his
book,23 8 there is only a fine line between giving information that
will allow a client who is genuinely in doubt to act properly, giving
information that will jog the memory of the client who has sup-
pressed information unconsciously or in the mistaken belief that it
is adverse, and giving information that is simply helpful in plan-
ning crime or fraud.2 3e The Commission's commentary is to like
effect, though not so detailed or so elegant. The Commission does
236. See note 233 and accompanying text supra.
237. MODEL RULES (Final Draft), supra note 2, rule 1.2(d)(emphasis added).
238. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 51, at 59-77.
239. Professor Freedman tells of one case in which a woman who had shot her husband
suppressed the fact that he had attacked her with a knife, in the mistaken belief that it was
adverse evidence. When her lawyer explained the defense of self-defense, she testified truth-
fully, and the lawyer's "prompting" thus served both the client and truth. Id. at 4-5, 75.
The dividing line between proper and improper information, for Professor Freedman, is
at "brute rationalization." M. FREEDMAN, supra note 51, at 75; see note 234 supra.
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not, however, explain why the lawyer must take steps to ascertain
the client's motivation.
Rule 1.2(e) is the repositioned and renumbered Miranda fea-
ture discussed near the end of the main body of this article.240 It
too requires action when the lawyer "knows or reasonably should
know," in this case, whether the client "expects assistance not per-
mitted by" the Final Draft or law generally.2  Putting the two
rules together, it appears that the client is fishing for advice or
help that the lawyer is prohibited by rule 1.2(d) from giving; rule
1.2(e) requires the lawyer to figure it out, level with the client, and
refuse forthrightly.
As I argue at the conclusion of this Addendum, these early
rules are still at the very core of the whole Final Draft, and still
represent not a betrayal of lawyer-client trust, but rather the ele-
vation of that trust to a higher plane. Even before reaching that
conclusion, though, it should be evident that requiring lawyers to
be active in assuring themselves that they are not being used or
played the fool is fully commensurate with the idea that lawyers'
services are limited, and that clients should be told about those
limitations early on. When it is still easy for the lawyer simply to
refuse to become involved with the client, it makes good sense to
require the lawyer to be active in taking responsibility for deciding
whether to cast his lot with the particular client. Lawyers who ac-
cept clients unwisely will not lightly be heard to argue that they
were caught unawares, for these rules impose a duty of vigilance at
the very gates of access to the profession. As we shall see, the very
rightness of the Commission's choice of the "reasonably should
know" standard here casts doubt on the Commission's refusal to
use that standard in the rule on client perjury.
A knowledge standard next appears in the Final Draft in rule
1.6, the general rule on discretionary disclosure of client secrets.
Surprisingly, the Final Draft states that disclosures under this rule
may be made to the extent the lawyer "believes" necessary, and
eschews the requirement that the belief be "reasonable." Rule
1.6(b)(2), which pertains to interdiction of the most serious client
crimes and frauds, follows up by allowing this discretionary choice
when the lawyer "believes" the harm will be that serious, again
without imposing a requirement of reasonableness. Furthermore,
240. See notes 164-69 and accompanying text supra. Rule 1.4(b) of the Discussion
Draft contained this Miranda feature.
241. MODEL RULES (Final Draft), supra note 2, rule 1.2(e).
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in what is surely a case of lax draftsmanship and not a deliberate
substantive choice, the rule says nothing about how much knowl-
edge or belief the lawyer must have that the conduct will take
place at all.242
The use of mere belief as the standard in this rule, which is
already controversial enough and hard enough for lawyers and eth-
ics committees to apply, seems questionable; it seems to sanction
shooting from the hip. It is doubly surprising and questionable
when one considers that this is the only rule in which the mere
belief is the standard. The best solution is surely to jettison the
definition altogether, and require that all lawyer beliefs that are
relevant to an ethical issue be reasonable beliefs in order to pass
muster.
Rule 1.16 speaks to lawyer withdrawal from representation of
a client not only in certain innocuous situations, but also in the
highly charged cases involving possible client misconduct that may
draw the lawyer into dangerous waters. Rule 1.16(a)(1) mandates
withdrawal (or an initial refusal to undertake the representation)
when the representation "is likely to result in" a violation of an
ethical or other legal duty by the lawyer . 4 s Again surprisingly, the
Commission used none of the definitions that it had so carefully
prepared, and did not even advert to the question of how sure the
lawyer must be that the impending problem is "likely." Rule
242. The full text of rule 1.6 of the Final Draft is as follows:
CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a cli-
ent except as stated in paragraph (b), unless the client consents after disclosure.(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer believes
necessary:
(1) To serve the client's interests, unless it is information the
client has specifically requested not be disclosed;
(2) To prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudu-
lent act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or sub-
stantial bodily harm, or substantial injury to the financial interest or
property of another;
(3) To rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudu-
lent act in the commission of which the lawyer's services had been
used;
(4) To establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, or to establish a de-
fense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based
upon conduct in which the client was involved; or
(5) To comply with the rules of professional conduct or other
law.
MODEL RULES (Final Draft), supra note 2, rule 1.6.
243. Id. rule 1.16(a)(1).
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1.16(b)(1), by contrast, allows withdrawal (even if harmful to the
client) when the lawyer "reasonably believes" that the client is us-
ing the lawyer to further fraudulent or criminal purposes.2
The second usage seems appropriate, for the lawyer should not
be required to stick with a situation that is rapidly deteriorating
until he knows that he is being used for an improper purpose, for it
may then be too late to withdraw. Furthermore, if the lawyer does
wait until some improper action has been taken with his help, he
will have the further dilemma of deciding whether to take rectify-
ing action, which is permitted under rule 1.6(b)(3) and may be
mandatory in practice.2 46 This may well put the client in a worse
position than if the lawyer simply withdraws early on. On the other
hand, lawyers should be made of sterner stuff than to withdraw at
the first whiff of malodor-a reasonable belief is properly required.
The failure of the Commission to use any of its definitions as
the trigger for mandatory withdrawals in the first half of rule 1.16,
however, suggests that it could not decide whether cases of ap-
proaching misconduct were more like initial decisions to take on a
client ("reasonably should know" standard of rule 1.2(d)), or more
like cases of courtroom perjury ("knows" standard of rule
3.3(a)(4)). Refusing to make a decision is not an acceptable solu-
tion for a drafting committee, however; the problem will not go
away.
A final area for comparison has to do with cases in which the
lawyer's own out of court representations are at issue, as opposed
to actions or evidence of the client himself. Rule 4.1 applies the
standard of "knowingly" to each of its subparts, which prohibit
lawyers from making false statements of law or fact, and from fail-
ing to disclose facts, in situations in which the failure is tanta-
mount to affirmative misrepresentation.2 " In none of these cases is
the additional requirement of seeking knowledge imposed by use of
the term "reasonably should know." Again the question: Why is
this requirement imposed at the initial interview stage, but not
here?
Putting together all of the key provisions in which the lawyer's
level of knowledge is important, it is hard to find a consistent and
principled theory at work in the Final Draft. Sometimes the duty
to find out is imposed, and sometimes it is not. Sometimes that
244. Id. rule 1.16(b)(1).
245. See notes 196-206 and accompanying text supra.
246. MODEL RULES (Final Draft), supra note 2, rule 4.1.
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question is left hanging. There appear to be direct inconsistencies
as well, for although a lawyer cannot assist a client's criminal con-
duct generally if he should know of its character, the lawyer is
barred from assisting the specific crime of perjury in court only
when he knows the truth.
If there are subtle differences in some of the situations just
discussed that properly call for subtly different rules, we should
expect to find enlightenment in the commentary. Unfortunately,
the commentary actually exacerbates the confusion, for in at least
two important instances, the commentary attributes an incorrect
standard to the very rule it is discussing, exactly at the point when
precision is needed to flush out the reasons, if any, for the differ-
ence in standard chosen.2 17
It may be argued, particularly by people who had taken the
main body of this article to heart, that in practice there may not
be a great deal of difference between the competing standards.
Proving that a lawyer "knew" of his client's fraudulent plans is
concededly difficult unless, of course, the client tries to bring the
lawyer down with him. But proving that "a lawyer of reasonable
prudence and competence would ascertain" that the client was
planning fraud may prove to be almost as difficult, unless the cli-
ent once again acts as chief witness. This is because the lawyer
may falsely assert that the client told a story that on its face raised
no suspicions whatsoever, one that would have fooled the average
lawyer with ease. It is hard to say how often the client will have an
interest in blaming the lawyer, and how often the client will main-
tain the innocence of both himself and his lawyer, but the percent-
ages should be the same no matter what a code has said.
For lawyers who are attempting to evade responsibility, then,
code language (indeed, the very idea of a code) will be an inconve-
247. The commentary to rule 3.3(a) states that a lawyer's own representations in open
court "may properly be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it
to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry." MODEL RULES (Final Draft), supra
note 2, at 125 (emphasis added). The text of the rule refers to "knowingly" only.
The commentary to rule 4.1 (concerning the lawyer's out of court representations) re-
fers back to rule 1.2(d) in these words: "The critical elements under Rule 1.2(d) are the
nature of the client's purpose, whether the lawyer knew of the purpose and whether the
lawyer assisted in carrying it out." Id. at 162-63 (emphasis added). This is incorrect, for the
standard in rule 1.2(d) is actually "knows or reasonably should know." Id. rule 1.2(d) (em-
phasis added).
The Commission's uncertainty is strikingly illustrated in Mr. Kutak's recent article in
which he incorrectly ascribes the "reasonably should know" standard to rules 3.3(a) and 4.1,
and in the next sentence "clarifies" that standard by stating that it does not involve investi-
gation by the lawyers. Kutak, supra note 222, at 1120.
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nience and little more. But for the great majority of lawyers, who
we expect will use a code as a self-study tool and see it as the
embodiment of the profession's aspirations for itself, a change of
language will carry an important message. Using the phrase "rea-
sonably should know" will alert lawyers to the necessity of being
vigilant at certain key points in their relationships with their
clients.
My own view is that in all of these rules wherein lawyer
knowledge of what the client is up to is important, it would be
preferable to impose a duty of inquiry upon the lawyer. If, upon
the very first meeting of the lawyer and the client, rule 1.2(d)
warns the lawyer to find out about what he is getting into, and rule
1.2(e) requires him to tell the client that that is what he is about,
the relationship will either terminate on the spot, or it will go for-
ward on the basis demanded by those rules. But once the client
has accepted the idea that the lawyer has certain obligations to the
legal system that will not be denied, it seems pointless to allow the
client to later engage in misconduct through use of the lawyer's
services, so long as the client makes the conduct subtle enough
that the lawyer will not "know" of the misconduct without inquiry.
But is a relationship in which the lawyer is constantly al-
lowed-even urged-to scrutinize the client a healthy one for the
profession and for the public and society? That is the subject of
some concluding remarks, prompted by an important recent article
by Professor Robert Burt 248 that reexamines our assumptions
about what trust means in the context of lawyer-client
relationships.
D. Conclusion: Telling the Truth About the Legal
Profession-A Radical Idea After All?
The main body of this article concluded with the theory that
since the reality of today's law practice is that lawyers cannot
blindly follow the orders of their clients, and that lawyers may
even have to reveal client confidences in certain situations (no
matter which code of lawyer conduct is in effect), a kind of "truth-
in-lawyering" principle demands that clients be told about that re-
ality. In this view, the Miranda feature of the Discussion or Final
Draft could lead to more client trust of lawyers, not less: clients
seeking prohibited assistance would at least be warned off rather
than betrayed later, and clients seeking legitimate help, even if at
248. Burt, supra note 168.
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the margins, could better understand and be more assured that
they truly had the full, loyal help of their chosen counsel.
Professor Burt's article lends support to this theory, for it
posits as a paradox the idea that if there are more incentives for
lawyers to reveal the secrets of their clients, there may be more
incentives for lawyers to talk to clients openly about that possibil-
ity, with the result that the trusting relationship, having weathered
the storm, may become real rather than merely proclaimed.249
In brief, Professor Burt's argument proceeds in this fashion.
First, he notes that despite the mythology of the legal profession
that lawyers gain the trust of clients by assuring them about the
confidentiality principle, the reality is that lawyer-client mistrust
is a pervasive fact.25 0 Certain conflicts are inherent in the relation-
ship," 1 and many others develop because personality clashes or
minor doubts about tactics and goals are allowed to fester and es-
calate instead of being worked out by frank discussion. Even when
there is not an actual conflict, clients frequently harbor suspicions
that their lawyers are not fully on board, and lawyers worry that
their clients may be withholding information or seeking unjust or
unrealistic ends.
The observation that lawyers may harbor suspicions about
what their clients are up to sets the stage for the major insight of
the article: because traditional rules of confidentiality command
the lawyer's silence unless he "knows" of impending client miscon-
duct, and because there is no incentive for him to find out, lawyers
soon develop mechanisms to avoid both knowledge and discussions
that may lead to knowledge.25 In this way lawyers avoid person-
ally distasteful conversations, and also hold on to clients that per-
haps they should not. But if a new code instead provided an incen-
tive for lawyers to find out about client misconduct, then lawyers
would suddenly have an incentive to initiate and follow up on open
discussion of such matters. The result might well be greater trust,
249. Id. at 1019.
250. Like the present article, Professor Burt's contains little empirical data to substan-
tiate it. His postulates about problems in the lawyer-client relation have a ring of truth to
them, however, and are certainly no less believable than what he characterizes as the myth.
To me it appears intuitively obvious that at least some lawyer-client conflict is inevitable.
See note 251 infra.
251. These include conflicts that may develop when an attorney advises a client that
the client's adversary will likely prevail or that probable victory will be delayed, or conflicts
that are created by the differing financial interests of the attorney and client. See Burt,
supra note 168, at 1019-21.
252. Id. at 1027-29.
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not less-in no small part because it would most often appear that
clients were honest and lawyers were zealous after all.
The incentive to open lawyer-client discussion of ethical issues
that Professor Burt advocated was to impose what he often re-
ferred to as a "negligence standard" upon lawyers, based on what
the lawyer "should know" about his clients.2 5 Since lawyers could
be held responsible for such knowledge unless they disassociated
themselves from client misconduct whenever a reasonable lawyer
would have done so, lawyers would be on inquiry, and would take
the initiative.
Writing at a time when only the Discussion Draft was availa-
ble, Professor Burt complained that although the drafters seemed
to recognize the problem of lawyer-client mistrust, their rules did
little to ameliorate the situation, and may have made it worse.
This is because, he argued, the Discussion Draft not only called for
more disclosures of client secrets,25' but also (in the Miranda pro-
vision) sometimes2 55 required the lawyer to warn the client about
the consequences of leveling with the lawyer. The Discussion Draft
disclosure provisions were thus self-defeating, in his view, for even
assuming that lawyers would reveal what the Discussion Draft
urged them to reveal, clients would simply not tell their lawyers
anything of substance, and the lawyer-client dance of mistrust
would continue. This state of affairs would create disincentives for
lawyers and clients to engage in frank discussion of the ethical is-
sues underlying their relationship, and would prompt lawyers to
omit the Miranda warnings whenever possible.
As noted earlier, I agree with Professor Burt's statement of
the paradox: acknowledgement of the fact that lawyers are not
hired guns can clear the air and demystify the profession, thus
putting lawyer-client trust on a firm and realistic basis. He is also
no doubt correct in suggesting that a negligence standard for mea-
suring lawyer responsibility will help prompt lawyers to take the
lead in establishing that new trust. Presumably, he will therefore
join in my applause for the Final Draft's adoption of the "reasona-
bly should know" standard (especially in rules 1.2(d) and 1.2(e)
regarding the crucial initial interview) and he will also join in my
253. Id. at 1030-31.
254. Id. at 1022. Professor Burt, in common with many observers, attributed broader
scope to the disclosure provisions than I did.
255. The Discussion Draft required the lawyer to give the Miranda warning if he had
"reason to believe" that the client was seeking prohibited assistance. MODEL RULES (Discus-
sion Draft), supra note 1, rule 1.4(b).
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complaint that the Final Draft does not carry this standard
through to all the other related areas involving possible client mis-
use of attorney services.
Actually, the Final Draft's inconsistency in following up on the
"reasonably should know" standard does not cause me as much
pain as it must Professor Burt, for throughout this article I have
tried to demonstrate that the incentives he calls for already exist
in the law generally. Regardless of what any lawyer code says, the
law of tort, agency, and joint participation in crime already com-
mands thoughtful lawyers to find out what uses are to be made of
their services, and to act accordingly. Lawyers already have power-
ful incentives to admit to themselves, and then put out for public
consumption, the facts about the important but limited role that
lawyers can and should play in our society.
Do the Model Rules, then, merely reflect and codify a preex-
isting reality? Or do they strengthen and quicken the trend toward
lawyer responsibility by imposing within the profession some full-
blown rules that are still developing outside of it? The answer is
probably that they do a little of each.
In either event, the Model Rules envision a society in which
lawyers are not the mere passive tools of their clients, or the mere
passive recepticles for their clients' secrets. Instead, lawyers are as-
signed the difficult task of assessing each situation and their own
moral position in it, making an ethical judgment, and then living
with the consequences. That is much the way it has always been,
but to purveyors and followers of the myth, it represents a brave
new world indeed.
In the final analysis, perhaps the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct are radical after all, but in a very different way than their
critics charged during the discussion period. They may be radical
not because they change the law of professional responsibility so
much-since they change it so little. Instead, the radical contribu-
tion of the Model Rules may be their honesty about what the law
already is, their willingness to admit the uncertainty of that law,
and their challenge to us not only to measure up, but to bring our
clients along with us.
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